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Congress, the Constitution, and
Supreme Court Recusal
Louis J. Virelli III*
Abstract
Recusal is one of the most hotly contested issues facing the
Supreme Court. From the wide-ranging debate over Supreme
Court recusal, however, a singular theme has emerged: Congress
must do more to protect the integrity and legitimacy of the Court
by regulating the Justices’ recusal practices. Herein lies the
problem. Rather than solve the puzzle of Supreme Court recusal,
direct congressional regulation has created an impasse between
Congress and the Court that has consequences for the reputation,
efficacy, and legitimacy of both Branches. In a precursor to this
Article, I recast the issue of Supreme Court recusal as a
constitutional question and argued that direct congressional
regulation of Supreme Court recusal violates the separation of
powers. This Article builds on that prior work and argues that
separation of powers principles are critical to understanding and
alleviating the inter-branch impasse over recusal. It contends that
Congress, rather than the Court, should take the lead in resolving
that impasse and that the separation of powers requires Congress
to use indirect constitutional mechanisms to do so. Specifically,
Congress should repeal the current statutory provision directly
regulating Supreme Court recusal and focus instead on more
*
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indirect constitutional tools—such as impeachment, procedural
reform, judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigation—
to influence the Justices’ recusal practices. This effort to frame the
recusal debate within its proper constitutional context permits a
more robust and productive dialogue about both the Justices’
recusal practices as well as the broader question of the nature and
dynamics of inter-branch relations in our tripartite government.
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I. Introduction
Supreme Court recusal1—the question of whether an
individual Justice may participate in a case—is currently among
the most high profile and controversial issues involving the
Court.2 Chief Justice Roberts’s 2011 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary (“Year End Report”) focused entirely on
Supreme Court ethics and recusal,3 and was immediately met
with sharp criticism by legislators and commentators.4 Sitting
1. As has become common practice in discussions about the
disqualification of judges, the term recusal in this instance will be used
interchangeably to include both the terms “disqualification,” which traditionally
refers to involuntary removal of a judge from a case, and “recusal,” which is
generally limited to a judge’s voluntary decision to withdraw from a case. See
RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES § 1.1, at 4 (Banks & Jordan, 2d ed. 2007) (“In fact, in modern practice
‘disqualification’ and ‘recusal’ are frequently viewed as synonymous, and
employed interchangeably.”).
2. See Letter from 138 Law Professors to the House & Senate Judiciary
Comms., Changing Ethical and Recusal Rules for Supreme Court Justices (Mar.
17, 2011) [hereinafter Law Professor Letter], available at http://
www.afj.org/judicial_ethics_sign_on_letter.pdf (calling for congressional reform
of Supreme Court ethical and recusal standards, and explaining that “[r]ecent
media reports have focused public attention” on the issue).
3. See CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2011) [hereinafter 2011 YEAR-END REPORT], available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endreport.pdf.
4. See Letter from Five Senators to Chief Justice Roberts (Feb. 13, 2012)
[hereinafter Senator Letter], available at http://www.afj.org/connect-with-theissues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/letter-to-supreme-court-2-13-12.pdf (asking
the Court to formally adopt the ethical and recusal requirements in the Judicial
Conference of the United States Code of Conduct for United States Judges);
Howard Bashman, A Way Forward on Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2012, at A20 (“[A]n alliance of government watchdog groups delivered 100,000
signatures to the Supreme Court . . . calling on the justices to voluntarily . . .
reform how they handle requests for recusals.”); Sherrilyn Ifill, The Chief
Strikes Out, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 4, 2012, 12:14 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/01/sherrilyn-ifills-the-chiefstrikes-out.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Ifill, The Chief Strikes
Out] (“Justice Roberts has not yet made the case for why the Supreme Court
should be exempt from the same ethics and recusal standards that govern [other
federal] judges.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); William
Yeomans & Herman Schwartz, Roberts to America: Trust Us, POLITICO.COM
(Jan. 24, 2012, 10:26 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71895.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (arguing that declining to explain recusal decisions
“denies the American people their right to know whether the justices are doing
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Justices were called to testify before Congress twice in the past
year about recusal issues,5 and more than 135 law professors
signed a letter to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees in
March of 2011 outlining the need for new recusal legislation to
“protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.”6 That letter led to
the introduction of a bill in the House of Representatives that
would establish new substantive and procedural recusal
standards for the Court.7 The Justices’ individual conduct has
also been the subject of recent criticism,8 including a heated
their job as they should”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
5. Justices Breyer and Kennedy were asked about Supreme Court ethics
and recusal standards as part of their testimony before a House subcommittee
on April 14, 2011. See Eileen Malloy, Supreme Court Justices Already Comply
with Ethics Rules, Kennedy, Breyer Say, 79 U.S. L. WK. 2389, 2389 (2011). On
October 5, 2011, Justices Breyer and Scalia testified on a similar topic before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Considering the Role of Judges under the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 4–41 (2011).
6. Law Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
7. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862,
112th Cong. (2011).
8. Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Antonin
Scalia, Sonia Sotomayor, and Clarence Thomas have all recently been criticized
for their interactions with politically interested entities that either have been or
are likely to come before the Court. Justices Scalia and Thomas were criticized
for attending Federalist Society fundraisers and dinners sponsored by the
conservative Koch brothers on the basis that ties to politically active
organizations could negatively impact their ability to remain impartial in future
cases. See Nan Aron, An Ethics Code for the High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 14,
2011, at A19; Nina Totenberg, Bill Puts Ethics Spotlight on Supreme Court
Justices, NPR (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/17/139646573/billputs-ethics-spotlight-on-supreme-court-justices (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Yeomans & Schwartz, supra
note 4 (demanding a “reasoned explanation . . . of the propriety of the recent
decision by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia to headline a fundraiser for the
Federalist Society”). Justice Thomas was similarly critiqued for his relationship
with a wealthy conservative contributor who allegedly provided funding for
projects of interest to the Justice and his wife. See Mike McIntire, The Justice
and the Magnate, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2011, at A1. Justice Alito has drawn
scrutiny for his attendance at fundraising dinners for the conservative American
Spectator magazine. See Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4. Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor were singled out for having accepted paid trips from
organizations with political viewpoints. See The Justices’ Junkets, WASH. POST,
Feb. 21, 2011, at A14 (noting that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor
accepted trips paid for by the American Bar Association, the American
Sociological Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union, respectively).
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public debate over Justices Elena Kagan and Clarence Thomas’s
participation in the Court’s review of the controversial Affordable
Care Act.9 Finally, exhaustive coverage in the news media and
legal academy has made recusal an unavoidable part of any
modern discussion of the Court.10
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C); Eric Segall &
Sherrilyn Ifill, Debate, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 131 (2012); Arlen Specter, Judging the Justices Over Conflicts of
Interest, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2012, at A17. Even before the Court agreed to
take the case, National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012), Justices Kagan and Thomas were publicly encouraged to recuse
themselves. Senator Orrin Hatch stated publicly that Justice Kagan should
recuse herself because “he is sure that Kagan participated in discussions about
the law and challenges to it while she served in the Justice Department as
[Solicitor General].” Mark Sherman, Sen. Hatch: Kagan Should Sit Out Health
Care Case, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:49 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
news/topstories/2011-02-04-3661380121_x.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Around the same time, seventyfour House Democrats sent a letter to Justice Thomas asking him to recuse
himself from the case “because of his wife’s ties to a lobbying group that opposes
the health care law.” Huma Khan, Should Supreme Court Justices Clarence
Thomas, Elena Kagan Sit Out Health Care Case?, ABCNEWS (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-court-justice-clarence-thomas-sit-healthcare/story?id=12878346 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
10. In addition to those cited above, several prominent media outlets
carried pieces addressing Supreme Court recusal in 2011 and 2012. See, e.g.,
John Gibeaut, Sitting This One Out, ABA J., Mar. 2012, at 18 (noting that “the
debate” regarding recusal law “will likely continue”); Joan Biskupic, Calls for
Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2011, at 6A
(discussing the calls for Justices Thomas and Kagan to recuse themselves from
hearing challenges to the Affordable Care Act); Editorial, Cloud over the Court,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, at A26 (addressing an alleged conflict of interest
between Justice Thomas and a Dallas real estate magnate); Michael B.
Mukasey, The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2011, at A17
(relating recent calls for recusal to the political process of appointing and
confirming judges); Editorial, Supreme Court: The Recusal Question, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2012, at A14 (arguing that “the public deserves an explanation” when a
Supreme Court Justice complies with or rejects a request to recuse); David
Jackson, Obama Health Care Politics Hits High Court, USA TODAY (Nov. 15,
2011 4:03 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/11/
obama-health-care-politics-hits-high-court/1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012)
(discussing letters written to Justices Thomas and Kagan, calling for their
recusal in the case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Dahlia Lithwick, Ethics Are for Other People,
SLATE.COM (Apr. 15, 2011 6:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
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Unfortunately, this intense focus on Supreme Court recusal
largely misses the point. By exclusively treating recusal as a
question of judicial ethics, commentators and legislators have
overlooked the fundamental constitutional questions that
ultimately drive the ongoing conflict between Congress and the
Court over the Justices’ recusal practices. This Article is the
second installment in a project designed to address that oversight
by recasting Supreme Court recusal as a constitutional
separation of powers issue. The precursor to this Article argued
that the separation of powers constitutionally precludes Congress
from creating legally binding recusal standards for the Justices—
what I will refer to here as direct regulation of Supreme Court
recusal decisions.11 This Article uses separation of powers
principles to move past the identification of constitutional issues
politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/ethics_are_for_other_people.html (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012) (arguing that “[i]ndividual judges, faced with questions of
compromising judicial conduct, are in the worst possible position to judge
themselves) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eric J. Segall,
An Ominous Silence on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/opinion/la-oe-segall-kagan-recusal-20120
212 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing calls for recusal of Justices in the
case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Tevi Troy, Health Care Recusal Is the Judges’ Call, POLITICO.COM
(Nov. 22, 2011, 9:24 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/ 1111/68943.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing Justices’ recusal in the case challenging
the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Rick Ungar, Scalia and Thomas Party with Obamacare Challengers on Day
Court Takes Up Case, FORBES (Nov. 15, 2011, 11:57 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/11/15/scalia-and-thomas-party-with-healthcareopponents-on-day-court-takes-up-healthcare-challenge/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2012) (discussing the ethics of the Justices and the case challenging the
Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Russell
Wheeler, What’s So Hard about Regulating Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics?—A
Lot, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
papers/2011/11/28-courts-wheeler (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing
recusal of Justices in the case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); George Zornick, The Nation: Clarence
Thomas Vs. Legal Ethics, NPR (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/
2011/11/15/142339329/the-nation-clarence-thomas-vs-legal-ethics (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing whether Justice Thomas should recuse himself in the
case challenging the Affordable Care Act) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
11. See Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court
Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181.
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and to offer solutions to the systemic constitutional problems
surrounding recusal at the Court. It recognizes that although
Congress may be constitutionally prohibited from directly
regulating
Supreme
Court
recusal,
Congress
retains
constitutional authority and responsibility to indirectly influence
recusal in ways that may better comport with our constitutional
scheme.
There are at least three major benefits to reexamining
recusal in the light of constitutional structure. First, such a
review exposes the most serious problem with the current
Supreme Court recusal regime, the (largely overlooked)
constitutional impasse between Congress and the Court over
recusal.12 Congress’s prior attempts to directly regulate recusal
have been met with indifference or polite disregard by the
Court,13 which in turn triggered calls for even more rigorous
congressional regulation.14 There are significant problems with
12. The constitutional “impasse” advanced here is similar to the first
element of a “constitutional showdown” as defined by Professors Posner and
Vermeule: “[A] disagreement between branches of government over their
constitutional powers.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 997 (2008). The conflict over recusal does
not yet rise to the level of a “showdown,” however, because it neither “ends in
the total or partial acquiescence by one branch in the views of the other [nor] . . .
creates a constitutional precedent.” Id.
13. See 79 U.S.L.W. 2389 (Apr. 19, 2011) (describing Justice Kennedy’s
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Financial Services and General
Government, in which the Justice expressed the view that “there is a
constitutional problem” with Congress prescribing ethical rules for the Court);
2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that “the limits of Congress’s
power to require recusal [of Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested”).
The Court’s position was confirmed in its recent refusal of a congressional
request to voluntarily adopt its own recusal reforms. See 2011 YEAR-END
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8–9 (explaining that the Justices’ recusal decisions are
unreviewable by the other Justices or another judicial body, and that those
decisions are materially different from those of lower-court judges and thus
harder to comport with the existing law on recusal); Letter from Chief Justice
Roberts to Five Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 17, 2012)
[hereinafter Chief Justice Letter], available at http://big.assets.huffing
tonpost.com/LtrtoChairmanLeahyonYear-EndReport02172012.pdf (explaining
that, despite the Senators’ request, “for the reasons explained in my year-end
report, the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges”). For a more detailed discussion of Supreme Court recusal practice, see
infra Part II.A.2.
14. See, e.g., Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R.
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this approach. Direct regulation of recusal is legally and
practically unenforceable against the Justices. Furthermore, the
Court has never conceded that Congress has the constitutional
authority to directly regulate its recusal practices, and has
consistently acted as if that authority is lacking.15 The result is
an effective impasse between Congress and the Court over
recusal that has implications for the legitimacy, integrity, and
efficacy of both Branches.
Second, reexamining recusal in the light of constitutional
structure better reveals the nature and dynamics of the interbranch conflict over recusal as well as the potential solutions to
that conflict. These solutions depend on a fundamental, yet
previously unanswered, question relating to Supreme Court
recusal—how should the impasse be resolved, and who is
responsible for resolving it? The answers lie with the separation
of powers and, ultimately, with Congress. Viewing recusal as a
separation of powers problem reveals that Congress and the
Court are not equally capable of facilitating a successful
resolution of the current impasse over recusal. The judicial
options delegated to the Court by the Constitution are likely to
harm the public perception, and thus democratic legitimacy, of
both Branches by making the Court seem self-serving or
obstinate. The constitutional choices assigned to Congress, by
contrast, offer greater possibilities for coordinated efforts between
the two Branches in pursuing their respective agendas regarding
recusal. In terms of how a resolution should be achieved, focusing
on Congress’s role as a constitutional actor allows us to see the
entire range of constitutional options available to it, including
862, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011) (requiring recusal reform); Robert Barnes, Roberts:
Justices Won’t Adopt Code of Conduct, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2012, at A7.
(explaining that “[m]embers of Congress, a group of law professors and outside
groups have called upon the court to adopt” ethics reform); Law Professor
Letter, supra note 2, at 1 (advocating for recusal reform); Senator Letter, supra
note 4 (requesting the Supreme Court to formally adopt the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges).
15. These factors are also relevant to the constitutional question of whether
Congress has the authority to directly regulate Supreme Court recusal in the
first instance, a question that is addressed infra at Part II.A and in my previous
work. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1185 (stating that separation of powers
principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court recusal).
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various indirect approachessuch as impeachment, procedural
reforms, judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigations—
that permit Congress to influence the Justices’ recusal decisions
without upsetting the delicate balance and coordination between the
Branches that our constitutional scheme requires.
Third, reevaluating recusal in terms of constitutional
structure provides insights into much larger questions about how
best to handle inter-branch disputes. The separation of powers
anticipates conflict among the coordinate Branches of the federal
government, but it does not always provide easy answers as to
how those conflicts should be treated or resolved. When two
Branches reach an impasse over which has the power to act, is
the answer a matter of law or constitutional politics? Which
branch must or should take the initiative in promoting an
amicable and workable resolution? Is the answer more difficult
when the disagreement involves the Court? The answers to these
questions are pivotal to understanding more fully the intricacies
of our constitutional structure, as well as to maintaining a
legitimate and effective constitutional democracy. The instant
analysis of the impasse between Congress and the Court over
recusal offers a useful view into the various approaches to be
taken and political and institutional benefits to be sought with
regard to other inter-branch conflicts.
This Article draws on the literature regarding Congress’s role
as a constitutional interpreter to argue that the separation of
powers is critical to resolving the current impasse between
Congress and the Court over recusal because it offers unique
answers as to both why Congress must take the lead in resolving
the impasse and how that resolution should be achieved. It
contends that Congress should use indirect constitutional
approaches, rather than direct regulation, to influence the
Justices’ recusal practices because doing so will alleviate the
intractable tension created by direct congressional regulation of
the Court and promote the democratic legitimacy of both
Branches by reflecting a better balance of power between them.
Part II describes the current Supreme Court recusal debate,
including the constitutional impasse that has arisen between
Congress and the Court over recusal. Part III draws on the
literature regarding Congress’s role as a constitutional
interpreter to more closely examine its role regarding recusal. It
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identifies the constitutional limits on Congress’s power over
recusal and explains why Congress, rather than the Court, must
be primarily responsible for breaking the constitutional impasse
over recusal, albeit through indirect measures. Part IV addresses
the array of indirect constitutional tools available to Congress
regarding recusal and makes the normative case for why
Congress should take the initiative to resolve the current impasse
over recusal at the Court. Part V concludes and discusses some of
the broader implications of the recusal analysis for the separation
of powers.
II. The Debate over Recusal at the Court
The debate over recusal at the Supreme Court can be
described in terms of two distinct viewpoints. The first is a
reformist view. The overwhelming majority of commentary from
legal academics, members of Congress, and journalists supports
some measure of recusal reform for the Court. Proponents of
reform express concern about the impact of the Justices’ recusal
practices on the legitimacy of the Court and on the due process
rights of individual litigants. The opposing view is focused on
judicial independence. It is primarily represented—and
occasionally, if rarely, put forth—by the Justices themselves. It is
grounded in concerns about constitutional structure and function,
and as such, centers on the unique role of the Court within our
constitutional system. The interaction of these differing
perspectives has created not only a heated controversy, but also
an impasse in the conversation about Supreme Court recusal
that, in my view, must be addressed if either set of concerns is to
be alleviated.
A. Supreme Court Recusal in Action
Before fleshing out these contrasting views on Supreme
Court recusal, it is useful to explain how recusal at the Court
works. Supreme Court recusal has consistently operated on
parallel tracks of congressional regulation and Supreme Court
adjudication.
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1. Congressional Regulation of Supreme Court Recusal
Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has engaged in
direct regulation of federal judges’ recusal practices. The
Judiciary Act of 1792 contained the first statutory recusal
standards.16 From 1792 through 1948, Congress revised the
recusal standards for federal judges several times, and “‘in each
instance . . . enlarged the enumerated grounds for seeking
disqualification.’”17 None of these revisions, however, applied to
Supreme Court Justices. In 1948, Congress amended the existing
recusal statute to include “justices” in addition to “judges” and
required recusal where a judge or Justice had been a material
witness or of counsel, possessed a “substantial” interest in the
case, or was related to an attorney or party in the case such that
it would be “improper, in [the judge’s] opinion” for the judge to
hear that case.18 In 1972, the American Bar Association (ABA)
adopted a new recusal rule in its Model Code of Judicial Conduct
that, inter alia, required recusal of a judge “in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”19
Two years later, Congress amended the federal recusal statute to
codify the ABA Model Code’s objective reasonableness standard.20
This is the version of the federal recusal statute that applies to
Supreme Court Justices today.
16. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79. It was not until
1821 that Congress offered recusal standards that added anything significant to
the common law criteria for judicial recusal, and even then the question of
enforcement was left entirely to the judge being asked to recuse himself and was
not applied to the Justices of the Supreme Court. See Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51,
3 Stat. 643.
17. Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
657, 664 (2004–05) (quoting RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION:
RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 23.1, at 672 (1996)).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E (2004). The Code also
mandated recusal when a judge was personally biased, had served as a lawyer
in the controversy, had a financial interest in the outcome of the case, or was
within the third degree of relationship with a party, lawyer, interested person,
or material witness in the case. See id. at 3E(1)(a)–(e).
20. See Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)) (requiring that a justice, judge, or
magistrate disqualify himself or herself, inter alia, “in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might be questioned”).

1546

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

In March 2011, however, thirty-three members of the House
of Representatives sought to further expand the requirements for
Supreme Court recusal with the introduction of the Supreme
Court Transparency and Disclosure Act.21 The bill was inspired in
part by a letter from 138 law professors to the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees outlining the need for legislation to
“protect the integrity of the Supreme Court.”22 The letter argued
that the Code of Conduct for United States Judges should be
applied to Supreme Court Justices.23 It then stated that “justices
must be subject to an enforceable, transparent process governing
recusal”24 and suggested some procedural reforms to achieve that
goal, such as requiring a “written opinion when a Supreme Court
justice denies a motion to recuse” and instituting “a procedure . . .
for review of a decision by a Supreme Court justice not to
recuse.”25 The bill, in turn, mandated that “[t]he Code of Conduct
for United States Judges . . . shall apply to the justices of the
United States Supreme Court.”26 It required the Justices to
disclose “in the public record of the proceeding the reasons for the
denial of [a recusal] motion” and established “a process under
which . . . other justices or judges of a court of the United States”
shall review a Supreme Court Justice’s denial of a recusal
motion.27 Although the bill has not yet been adopted, it evidences
21. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862,
112th Cong. (2011).
22. Law Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 1.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. H.R. 862, § 2(a).
27. Id. § 3(a)(2), (b). In addition to attempting to regulate Supreme Court
recusal directly, Congress has begun in recent months to utilize some of its
other constitutional tools with regard to the Justices’ recusal practices,
including asking sitting Justices to testify about recusal matters. On April 14,
2011, Justices Breyer and Kennedy testified before a House subcommittee about
Supreme Court ethics and recusal standards, and on October 5, 2011 Justices
Breyer and Scalia testified about the same topic before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See supra note 5. Although both instances added public attention
and awareness to the question of Supreme Court ethics and recusal as well as
engaged the Court and its individual members actively and personally in the
debate in a way that statutory prescriptions do not, they were relatively lowprofile events that were not entirely dedicated to ethics and recusal questions.
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the ongoing interest in legislative solutions to Supreme Court
recusal issues.
Congress’s focus on direct regulatory solutions to the
perceived problems with Supreme Court recusal represents a
popular and well-intentioned attempt to promote the important
features of legitimacy and integrity at the Court. This regulatory
approach has nevertheless failed to effectively constrain the
Justices.
2. The Justices’ Recusal Practices
A brief examination of the history of the Court’s recusal
practices reveals that Supreme Court recusal operates in almost
precisely the same way today as it did at the Founding—as a
personal, independent, unreviewable decision by an individual
Justice whether to participate in an individual case. Around the
time of the Founding, recusal was both procedurally and
substantively a purely judicial question. Recusal doctrine was the
product of judge-made common law,28 and judges were
empowered to make the initial (and, in the case of United States
Supreme Court Justices, the final) ruling as to their own
recusal.29
Decisions by prominent members of the Court also reflect the
Justices’ unfettered approach to recusal. Chief Justice John
As such, they did not have the full impact that more formal, targeted hearings
may provide. For a more detailed discussion of the promise of congressional
hearings for seeking resolutions to the impasse over recusal at the Court, see
infra Part IV.A.4.
28. See FLAMM, supra note 1, §§ 1.2−1.4, at 5–8 (describing recusal
practices as developing in the English common law and being adopted by the
American colonial courts and, later, the federal Judiciary).
29. All of this information is consistent with historical accounts of the
importance placed on the independence of judges in the period. As Professor
Gerber explains in his detailed account of judicial independence in the colonial
courts, a separate and independent judiciary was vitally important to each of
the colonial and state systems that functioned as precursors to our federal
government under the Constitution, as well as to the Framers as a check
against potential overreaching by the Legislature, especially in the area of
federal state relations. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787, 34−37 (2011).
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Marshall presided over and wrote his famous opinion in Marbury
v. Madison30 despite the fact that he was personally responsible
for failing to deliver the judicial commission that gave rise to the
case. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes reviewed several cases as a
Supreme Court Justice that he had participated in as a member
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.31 Similarly,
Justice Hugo Black sat for multiple cases reviewing legislation he
had been instrumental in passing as a member of the Senate.32
Finally, Chief Justice Harlan Stone retracted his own recusal
decision in a case, not because his views changed regarding his
fitness to participate, but because he was concerned that without
his participation the Court would not be able to achieve a
quorum.33
This sort of independent decision-making by the Justices did
not change after Congress amended the recusal statute in 1948 to
purportedly include Supreme Court Justices.34 The Justices
continued to determine their own recusal status without any
review or, in most cases, any public explanation for their decision.
The rare instances where the Justices chose to publicly disclose
30. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
31. See generally Worcester v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539
(1905), aff’g 64 N.E. 581 (Mass. 1902); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903),
aff’g 62 N.E. 248 (Mass. 1901); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903), aff’g
61 N.E. 54 (Mass. 1901); Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903), aff’g 55 N.E.
77 (Mass. 1899).
32. See generally Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine
Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161 (1945) (construing the Fair Labor Standards Act);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the constitutionality of
the FLSA). Justice Black authored the FLSA while in the Senate. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 611 (1987).
His decision to participate in a case argued before the Court by a former law
partner even drew the public ire of Justice Robert Jackson in the only
documented dispute among Supreme Court Justices about recusal. See generally
Jewell Ridge, 325 U.S. at 897 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Dennis J.
Hutchison, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 203 (1988) (noting
that Justice Jackson’s public disagreement “shocked the country”).
33. See N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946); Stempel, supra note 32, at
618–19 (describing Chief Justice Stone’s standards for disqualification as
“flexible”).
34. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 455, 62 Stat. 908 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006)) (including any “justice or judge of the
United States” in recusal requirements).
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their views regarding recusal confirm that the Justices’ decisions
were made individually and independently. In Laird v. Tatum,35
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist published a memorandum
explaining his decision not to recuse himself from a case
challenging the constitutionality of a domestic surveillance
program that he had been involved with (and testified about
before Congress) during his time in the Justice Department’s
Office of Legal Counsel.36 Although Justice Rehnquist cited the
relevant recusal statute, he went on to remind the reader that
“under the existing practice of the Court disqualification has been
a matter of individual decision,”37 and pointed out that the unique
nature of the Court makes Supreme Court recusal difficult as an
institutional matter.38 In light of these special considerations,
Justice Rehnquist argued that a Supreme Court Justice has a
“duty to sit where not disqualified,”39 and as such should not
“bend[] over backwards” to recuse himself.40 Justice Scalia
described a similar process more than twenty years later in his
memorandum in Cheney v. U.S. District Court.41 Justice Scalia
was asked to recuse himself as a result of his recent participation
in a hunting trip with the Vice President, who was a named party
in the suit. In explaining his reasons for not recusing himself,
35. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
36. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 592 (discussing Justice Rehnquist’s
participation in Laird v. Tatum). See generally Laird, 408 U.S. at 2
(demonstrating that Justice Rehnquist participated in determining the
constitutionality of a domestic surveillance program).
37. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 833 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.).
38. See id. at 837 (denying a motion for the Court to withdraw its opinion
in Laird, 408 U.S. 1). Justice Rehnquist made the identical argument in another
memorandum explaining a decision not to recuse himself in Microsoft Corp. v.
United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000):
Finally, it is important to note the negative impact that the
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our
Court. Here—unlike the situation in a District Court or a Court of
Appeals—there is no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the
Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but
the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a
lower court decision by an equally divided court.
39. Laird, 409 U.S. at 837.
40. Id. at 838 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.).
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Justice Scalia rejected the statutory presumption that he should
“resolve any doubts in favor of recusal” because “the Supreme
Court . . . is different.”42
The Court reinforced the idea that the Justices have their
own permissive view of recusal in its 1993 Statement of Recusal
Policy.43 The Statement was signed by seven of the nine sitting
Justices and only addressed cases where a Justice’s relative
participates in a matter before the Court.44 As Professor
Sherrilyn Ifill described it, “the Recusal Policy simply reflects the
Justices’ own sense of what to them would constitute a
reasonable basis upon which to question a judge’s impartiality.”45
Most recently, Chief Justice Roberts explained in his Year-End
Report that “[l]ike lower court judges, the individual Justices
decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted.”46 He went
on to explain that due to institutional differences between the
Supreme Court and the lower courts, a “Justice accordingly
cannot withdraw from a case as a matter of convenience or simply
to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an obligation to the
Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding to withdraw
from a case.”47 All of these examples demonstrate that, at
minimum, the Justices consider a host of prudential factors in
making their recusal decisions, and they do so unencumbered by
the prospect of review or the presence of statutory requirements.
As Professor Jeffrey Stempel so aptly described it, “Supreme
Court recusal practice provides an almost unique illustration in
American government of substantive law without force when
applied to a certain institution.”48
42. Id. at 915.
43. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court, Statement of Recusal Policy
(Nov. 1, 1993), reprinted in FLAMM, supra note 1, app. D, at 1101–03
[hereinafter Statement of Recusal Policy].
44. Justices Blackmun and Souter did not sign the policy. See id. at 1101–
03 & n.1.
45. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and
the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 626 (2002) [hereinafter
Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?] (emphasis omitted).
46. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 8.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Stempel, supra note 32, at 642.
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B. The Arguments over Reform
The Justices’ longstanding practice of making individualized,
unreviewable recusal decisions has not, however, gone unnoticed.
Critics of the Court’s recusal practices argue that the Justices’
failure to submit their decisions to more traditional legal
processes has damaged the integrity and reputation of the Court.
The Justices’ increasingly publicized involvement in political
causes and organizations has highlighted concerns about the
fairness and impartiality of the Justices’ decisions and has
resulted in calls for more stringent ethics and recusal
standards.49 The fact that the Justices’ recusal decisions are
unreviewable has incited discussion about the quality of those
decisions, especially in fact-specific inquiries like recusal in which
a Justice functions as both fact finder and adjudicator.50
Advocates of recusal reform have suggested mandating review of
an individual Justice’s decision not to recuse by the remainder of
the Court or by a special committee of federal judges assembled
specifically for that purpose. Professor Stempel has proposed a
standard of review under which “[a]ny party aggrieved by the
refusal of a Supreme Court Justice to disqualify himself may, on
timely motion, obtain review by the full Supreme Court.”51 The
49. The most recent and popular movement in this regard is to apply the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges to the Justices. See Supreme Court
Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011); Law
Professor Letter, supra note 2, at 2.
50. As Professor Stempel explained:
The Court also lacks any formal rule, mechanism, or custom of
permitting fact development in aid of a recusal motion . . . [T]o this
author’s knowledge, litigants questioning the impartiality of a
Supreme Court Justice have never been permitted to develop the
facts of the alleged conflict under the auspices of the Court.
Occasionally, as in Tatum, a Justice will offer a version of the facts in
answer to the motion, which hardly passes as meaningful discovery or
even scrutiny.
Stempel, supra note 32, at 642; see also Amanda Frost, Keeping Up
Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L.
REV. 531, 576 (2005) (noting how in his memorandum in Cheney v. U.S. District
Court, “Justice Scalia revealed facts about circumstances and logistics of the trip
that previously had been unknown” as part of his explanation for deciding not to
recuse himself from the case).
51. Stempel, supra note 32, at 644.
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2011 House bill on Supreme Court ethics and recusal went
further, allowing for review of a Justice’s decision not to recuse by
“other justices or judges or a court of the United States, among
whom retired justices and senior judges . . . may be included.”52
The most compelling criticism of the Court’s recusal practices
involves the Justices’ reluctance to explain their decisions. The
Court offers public explanations of its decisions as a means of
remaining accountable and protecting its own legitimacy. The
Justices’ reluctance to explain their recusal decisions imperils
that accountability and legitimacy, especially because the
practice is out of step with judicial behavior more broadly. The
lack of transparency in the Court’s current recusal practices has
been described as indefensible in a modern democratic society,
particularly in an age where other information about the Justices’
practices is so readily available, and has inspired calls for
statutory requirements that Justices publish their reasons for
denying a recusal motion.53 Professor Debra Lynn Bassett has
advocated for greater disclosure of the Justices’ reasons for
recusal through “statements of interest.”54 More recently,
Professors William Yeomans and Herman Schwartz have argued
that:
[T]he courts’ fundamental legitimacy rests on the notion that
judges . . . explain what they have done in reasoned opinions
for all to read. . . . This same transparency is even more
essential when Justices apply the law to themselves. . . .
Courts obviously need secrecy for their deliberations and
decision making. But there can be no harm in a justice
explaining why he or she withdraws from a case or refuses to
withdraw.55

52. H.R. 862, § 3(b) (emphasis added). The prospect of allowing lower court
judges to review Supreme Court recusal decisions potentially runs afoul of the
constitutional requirement that there be “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1.
53. See H.R. 862, § 3(a)(2) (“If a justice of the Supreme Court denies a
motion . . . that the justice should be disqualified . . . the justice shall
disclose . . . the reasons for the denial of the motion.”); Law Professor Letter,
supra note 2, at 2.
54. Bassett, supra note 17, at 695.
55. Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4.
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Finally, the above complaints evoke a common concern about the
effects of the Justices’ recusal practices on the public perception
of, and confidence in, the Court. For an institution like the
Supreme Court that depends so heavily for its institutional
effectiveness on public confidence,56 any damage done to that
perception presents a significant problem for the Court
specifically, for the other institutions of government, and for the
principle of separation of powers more generally.
The responses to these arguments for recusal reform come
principally from the Justices themselves. They focus, perhaps not
surprisingly considering their source, less on the nature of the
Justices’ recusal decisions and more on the effects of those
decisions on the Court’s institutional mission. The central theme
of this viewpoint is derived from the common law “rule of
necessity,” under which a judge’s decision to recuse is overridden
by the lack of an adequate replacement to hear the case.57 In the
context of the lower federal courts, the rule of necessity is
effectively a nullity. Congress has provided, pursuant to its power
to create the lower federal courts, myriad options for calling into
service replacement judges in the event a judge is recused.58 The
56. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992)
The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and
to declare what it demands. . . . Thus, the Court’s legitimacy depends
on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which
their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
the Nation.
57. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980) (“‘[A]lthough a judge
had better not, if it can be avoided, take part in the decision of a case in which
he has any personal interest, yet he not only may but must do so if the case
cannot be heard otherwise.’”(quoting F. POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE 270 (6th ed. 1929))); see also FLAMM, supra note 1, § 20.2, at
576–77 (explaining that the “rule of necessity” involves the principle that
disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power to
act in the premises—that is, “where disqualification would result in an absence
of judicial machinery capable of dealing with a matter, . . . disqualification must
yield to necessity”).
58. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291, 292, 294 (2006) (permitting active circuit court
judges, active district court judges, and retired judges or Justices, respectively,
to sit by designation).
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Supreme Court, however, is different. The constitutional mandate
that there be “one supreme Court”59 creates significant—if not
impenetrable—barriers to the availability of replacement
Justices.60 The lack of replacement Justices in turn creates the
possibility that the recusal of a single Justice will facilitate a tie
vote, resulting in a non-precedential affirmance of the decision
below that does not “resolve the significant legal issue presented
by the case.”61 Recusal is also problematic for the litigants, the
argument goes, because a decision by an irreplaceable Justice to
recuse himself is “effectively the same as casting a vote against
the petitioner.”62 In cases involving at least one recusal, the
petitioner must garner a larger percentage of the available
Justices’ votes both on the merits (five out of eight rather than
five out of nine) and at the certiorari stage (four out of eight
rather than four out of nine for a certiorari petition).63 The
recusal of multiple Justices is even more problematic for the
Court, as it could defeat quorum in a specific case and thus make
the Court powerless to exercise its constitutional function as the
final adjudicator of the “cases or controversies” properly before
it.64
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
60. See Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Senator Wheeler, Mar. 22,
1937, available at http://newdeal.feri.org/court/hughes.htm (“The Constitution
does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts or two or more parts
of a Supreme Court functioning in effect as separate courts.”); see also Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, An Open Discussion with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L.
REV. 1033, 1039 (2004) (explaining that “there’s no substitute for a Supreme
Court Justice”); Wheeler, supra note 10, at 2 (contending that a court of lower
court judges sitting in review of Supreme Court recusal decisions “would most
likely violate the Constitution’s ‘one Supreme court’ mandate”). But see Lisa T.
McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy
Implications of Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the
Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 104 (2011) (arguing that retired Justices, but
not those that have resigned their commissions, may be eligible to substitute for
recused Justices in Supreme Court cases).
61. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.).
See also Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 43, at 1103.
62. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916.
63. Professor Lubet described this phenomenon as the “Certiorari
Conundrum.” Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme Court Justices: The
Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 661–65 (1996).
64. Virelli, supra note 11, at 1213–17. These same arguments may apply in
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There are other reasons to support the Justices’ retaining
control over recusal that are not grounded in concerns about a
lack of eligible replacements for a recused Justice. Justice Scalia
has argued that limiting the Justices’ independence over recusal
decisions could lead to politically motivated attacks designed to
influence the outcome of a case by forcing unsympathetic Justices
to recuse themselves.65 He explains that “[t]he people must have
confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist
in a system that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest
friendship or favor, and in an atmosphere where the press will be
eager to find foot-faults.”66 The Justices have also raised
constitutional concerns about congressional influence over
recusal decisions at the Court. While testifying before the House
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government,67
Justice Kennedy pointed out that “there is a constitutional
problem” with making statutory recusal standards binding on the
Court.68 In his Year-End Report, Chief Justice Roberts made a
point of explaining that “the limits of Congress’s power to require
recusal [of Supreme Court Justices] have never been tested. The
Justices follow the same general principles with respect to
recusal as other federal judges, but the application of those
principles can differ due to the unique circumstances of the
Supreme Court.”69

other contexts, such as the prompt filling of vacancies on the Court, but do not
raise the same constitutional problems focused on here, as vacancies are not
(except in the nearly unprecedented case of impeachment) created by Congress
and thus are not an example of an exercise of congressional power rendering the
Court inoperable. See infra Part III.B.
65. This phenomenon is considered by many to be the driving force behind
the recent calls for Justices Kagan and Thomas to recuse themselves from cases
reviewing the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Mukasey, supra note 10 (“The
persistence of recusal issues appears to have little to do with the legal merits . . .
but a great deal to do with . . . agenda-driven politics . . . .”).
66. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 928.
67. Malloy, supra note 5, at 2389.
68. Id.
69. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
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C. The Impasse

The ongoing debate over the proper role of legislative
involvement in Supreme Court recusal practice reflects a
constitutional impasse between Congress and the Court.
Although proponents of statutory recusal standards acknowledge
the important differences between recusal in the lower courts and
the Supreme Court,70 concerns over the integrity, fairness, and
transparency of the Court have caused them to look to Congress
to standardize and strengthen the Court’s recusal standards. But
Congress’s attempts to regulate the Court’s recusal practices
have inspired both direct and indirect resistance from the
Justices. In February of 2012, Chief Justice Roberts responded to
a request from five members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
asking the Court to formally adopt the Judicial Conference of the
United States Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which
sets ethical and recusal standards for the lower federal courts.
The Chief Justice plainly stated in a letter to the Senators that
“the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of Conduct.” The Chief
Justice’s remarks came in the wake of his Year-End Report, in
which he highlighted the unique role of the Supreme Court
within the Judiciary and made clear that the Justices consider
their ethical and recusal obligations to be individual and
independent.71
These recent (and defiant) comments about recusal are the
most direct in a long list of indications that the Justices do not
feel bound by congressional attempts to regulate their recusal
decisions. For instance, the Court has never conceded that
Congress has the constitutional authority to set recusal
standards.72 Moreover, although recusal remains a relatively
70. See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 1, § 29.4, at 916–17 (suggesting that there
may be a “more compelling ‘duty to sit’ for Supreme Court Justices than for
other judges”); Bassett, supra note 17, at 682–93 (discussing proposals for
standards of Supreme Court recusal); Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note
45, at 619 (“To be certain, Justices on the Supreme Court face legitimate
concerns that are not at issue for judges on other courts who are faced with
recusal motions.”).
71. 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
72. See id. at 7 (“[T]he limits of Congress’s power to require recusal have
never been tested.”).
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common practice at the Court,73 the Justices rarely explain their
decisions.74 When explanations are proffered, institutional
concerns about the effective functioning of the Court predominate
over the statutory standards put forth by Congress.75 Most
importantly, because the statutory standards are not enforceable
against the Court and because the Court’s decisions are not
reviewable, there is no coercive legal action available to Congress
to force the Justices to change their practices. In the words of
Professor Ifill, “the Justices encourage and protect a fiercely
independent approach to their recusal determinations.”76
This impasse is more than a legal abnormality or
inconvenience. In many ways, it is the source of much of the
public frustration with, and criticism of, the Court and Congress
over recusal. On a small scale, the impasse makes it more
difficult to achieve any sort of lasting resolution or thoughtful
treatment of the recusal question as the two sides effectively talk
past one another. On a much grander scale, the impasse over
recusal raises the same systemic problem as any seemingly
irreconcilable dispute between two coequal Branches—doubts
about the legitimacy of our constitutional democracy. As the two
Branches continue to appear at odds over when and how
Supreme Court Justices should refrain from participating in
specific cases, both sides appear to be obstinate, arbitrary,
ineffective, or some combination thereof. This promotes an air of
lawlessness around the issue that weakens confidence in our
public institutions and creates problems for our constitutional
structure. Finally, the recusal impasse is significant because it
could be the first step in what Professors Posner and Vermeule
73. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (explaining that “Justices
would almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut conflict situations”);
see also Times Topics, Elena Kagan, NYTIMES.COM (Oct. 4, 2010)
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/k/kagan_elena/index.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (noting that “[b]ecause of her tenure as solicitor
general, Justice Kagan has recused herself from about half of the 54 cases”
so far on the Court’s docket for the 2010 term) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
74. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 50, at 569 (“Judges who recuse themselves
rarely issue a decision explaining why.”).
75. See infra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
76. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 45, at 622.
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call “constitutional showdowns”—inter-branch disputes over
constitutional authority that end in the development of new
constitutional precedents.77
The harmful effects of the impasse over recusal represent a
serious and heretofore unforeseen or unmentioned problem
within Supreme Court recusal. The existing debate over what the
Court should be required to do and whether those requirements
would lead to untenable consequences largely misses the point.
The impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal should
first be viewed as a constitutional separation of powers problem
in order to properly contextualize the entire range of tensions and
issues at stake. Only then can we envision a solution that is
worthy of a conflict between two coequal Branches of government.
III. Recusal and the Separation of Powers
A. Congress’s Constitutional Responsibilities
Resolving a conflict between two Branches of government
necessarily evinces the separation of powers. The Framers’
concept of the separation of powers is often attributed to
Montesquieu,78 and is embodied in a tripartite constitutional
structure that envisions constitutional responsibilities for each
branch that are separate and apart from its counterparts in order
to protect against overreaching or aggrandizement by any single
branch. This has remained a foundational principle of American
77. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 997.
78. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 149–62 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 1949) (1748) (discussing separation of
powers as a concept for ensuring liberty). In addition to being an implicit part of
many of the arguments about governmental structure at the Convention,
Montesquieu’s views regarding the separation of powers were explicitly relied
upon by several of the delegates. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 391 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (remarks of Butler) (“The
great Montesquieu says, it is unwise to entrust persons with power, which by
being abused operates to the advantage of those entrusted with it.”); 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(remarks of Madison) (“[A]ccording to the observation of Montesquieu,
tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical
manner.”).
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government ever since. As the Court recently reiterated in Stern
v. Marshall,79 the separation of powers, at minimum, anticipates
a division of labor among the Branches, such that some spheres of
authority are reserved exclusively to individual Branches.80 The
Stern Court went on to acknowledge, however, that “the three
Branches [of the federal government] are not hermetically sealed
from one another.”81 In fact, some redundancies are necessary in
order to effectively protect against the aggrandizement and
encroachment that the Framers saw as crucial to warding off
tyranny.82 Chief among these redundancies is the shared
responsibility of all three constitutional Branches of government
to interpret the Constitution, especially with regard to the
separation of powers.83 As James Madison explained:
I beg to know upon which principle it can be contended that
any one department draws from the Constitution greater
powers than another in marking out the limits of the powers of
the several departments. The Constitution is the charter of the
people to the government; it specifies certain great powers as
absolutely granted and marks out the departments to exercise
them. If the constitutional boundary of either be brought into
question, I do not see than any one of these independent
departments has more right than another to declare their
sentiments on that point . . . .84
79. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
80. As Chief Justice Roberts articulated in Stern:
Under “the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from
the scheme of a tripartite government” adopted in the Constitution,
“the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ . . . can no more be shared”
with another branch than “the Chief Executive, for example, can
share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with
the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto.”
Id. at 2608 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 2609.
82. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 617 (1984) (“This
checks-and-balances inquiry—a comparison of impacts on ‘essential functions’—
is . . . at the heart of the framers’ [separation of powers] formula.”).
83. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and
Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1966 (2003) (“Both the Court and Congress interpret
the Constitution from the perspective of a particular institution.”).
84. 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 238–39 (William T. Hutchinson et al.
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Madison’s view was echoed by Presidents Jefferson and Jackson85
and nearly two centuries later by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Nixon:86 “In the performance of assigned constitutional
duties, each branch of the Government must initially interpret
the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any
branch is due great respect from the others.”87
The scholarly literature on Congress’s interpretive
responsibilities is, not surprisingly, wide-ranging and diverse.
Questions abound about, inter alia, Congress’s institutional
competency to interpret the Constitution,88 the role of
institutional design in improving that core competency,89 and how
to balance the interpretive role of nonjudicial actors like Congress
against that of the Judiciary.90 This robust debate, however, does
eds., 1962–91). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 277 (James Madison)
(Colonial Press ed, 1901) (“The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate
by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident, can
pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between
their respective powers.”).
85. Jefferson wrote that “nothing in the Constitution has given [the judges]
a right to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for
them.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 11
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49, 50 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905); see
also President Jackson’s Veto Message to the Senate (July 10, 1832), in 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1908) (“The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the
opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both.”).
86. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
87. Id. at 703.
88. See, e.g., Symposium, The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of
Congress in the Twenty-First Century, Panel III: Is Congress Capable of
Conscientious Responsible Constitutional Interpretation?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 499,
449–538 (2009) (featuring commentary by Professors Hugh Baxter, Michael
Gerhardt, Mark Tushnet, and Jeffrey Tulis); Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 707 (1985) (arguing
that Congress “is fulfilling the duty it shares with the judiciary and the chief
executive to uphold the Constitution”); Abner Mikva, How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. REV. 587, 590 (1983)
(“Congress should make more of an effort to screen legislation for possible
constitutional shortcomings and to clarify its motives as an aid to the courts.”).
89. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of
a Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2001) (arguing that Congress
can be improved by focusing “upon questions of institutional design”).
90. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
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not ultimately take issue with the narrower conception of
legislative constitutional interpretation articulated by the
Founding Fathers and the Court. As Professor James Bradley
Thayer stated in his seminal article The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,91 “it is the legislature
to whom this power is given—this power, not merely of enacting
laws, but of putting an interpretation on the [C]onstitution which
shall deeply affect the whole country.”92 In the more than 100
years since Professor Thayer’s pronouncement, a general
consensus has emerged that the separation of powers includes an
obligation of Congress to consider the constitutionality of its
actions vis-à-vis the other Branches.93 That is not to say that
Congress is a better source of constitutional understanding than
the courts, or that Congress as a descriptive matter engages in
robust constitutional interpretation regularly. None of these far
more controversial issues is necessary to the task at hand.
Because Supreme Court recusal has created an impasse between
Congress and the Courts, it is enough for the present discussion
to acknowledge that Congress is constitutionally authorized and
(at least in part) responsible for evaluating the constitutionality

Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362 (1997) (discussing
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and arguing for “judicial primacy
without qualification”).
91. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
92. Id. at 136.
93. Professors Alexander and Schauer put it thusly:
A recurrent claim in American constitutional discourse is that judges
should not be the exclusive and authoritative interpreters of the
Constitution. The Constitution speaks to all public officials, it is said,
and thus all officials, not just judges, must make their own decisions
about what the Constitution commands. To hold otherwise, it is
argued, is to fail to recognize the constitutional responsibilities of
officials who happen not to be judges.
Alexander & Schauer, supra note 90, at 1359–60; see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 343–45 (1994) (maintaining that executive officials should not
defer to constitutional decisions of the Judiciary that they believe are wrong);
Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1, 25–28 (1996) (arguing that non-exclusivity is the route to a socially desirable
“populist” constitutional law).
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of its actions and, in turn, for resolving the constitutional tension
created by Supreme Court recusal.
Reorienting Supreme Court recusal in a constitutional
framework and acknowledging Congress’s constitutional
responsibilities with regard to the separation of powers highlights
two significant constitutional questions about the impasse over
recusal. The first is whether Congress has the constitutional
authority to limit a Justice’s participation in a specific case. The
second is which branch of government is best suited to resolve
that impasse. In answering each of these questions, the
remainder of this Part highlights the need—as a matter of both
constitutional law and policy—for alternative approaches by
Congress to the issue of recusal at the Court.
B. Constitutional Limits on Congressional Regulation
Congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal triggers
serious concern about the separation of powers;94 may Congress
pass legislation affecting the Court’s recusal decisions, or does the
Constitution vest sole authority for those decisions in the Justices
themselves? Article III unequivocally vests the “judicial Power of
the United States” in the Supreme Court and “in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may . . . ordain and establish.”95 It does
not, however, offer any further explanation of the scope or
substance of the judicial power, much less whether and to what
extent that power includes the authority of Supreme Court
Justices to decide questions of their own recusal. Without greater
textual guidance on the matter, constitutional history, practice,

94. See Virelli, supra note 11 (advancing this argument in greater detail).
95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. This express congressional power over the
lower federal courts is not applicable to the Supreme Court, and is a significant
limit on the inherent power of those lower courts. It shifts the balance of power
between Congress and the lower courts toward Congress while leaving the
balance between Congress and the Supreme Court undisturbed. This difference
in the constitutional power sharing arrangement between Congress and the
Supreme Court versus the lower federal courts is the main reason why the
instant analysis focuses solely on recusal at the Supreme Court, rather than
federal courts in general.
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and structure become crucial to understanding the constitutional
status of Supreme Court recusal.
The records of the Constitutional Convention and state
ratifying debates are virtually silent on the meaning of the
“judicial Power” generally, let alone the power of judges and
Justices to decide questions about recusal.96 A historical analysis
of Supreme Court recusal under Article III must therefore be
based both on the sources of information most commonly
understood to have been relied upon by the Framers in fashioning
the judicial power—the “business of the Colonial courts and the
courts of Westminster when the Constitution was framed”97—as
well as on “early congressional and judicial precedent”
interpreting Article III.98 Although little direct evidence exists of
the Framers’ view of Supreme Court recusal specifically, the
evidence that is available supports the idea that recusal was, in
and around the Founding, both procedurally and substantively a
question for an independent Judiciary. English and colonial
judges developed highly permissive common law standards for
recusal99 and used those standards to decide their own recusal
96. See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 708 (1998) (offering compelling evidence of the meaning of
various terms in Article III pertaining to judicial power, but concluding that
little if any information from the period provides useful insight into the meaning
of “judicial Power” specifically); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A
Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. REV.
761, 767 (1997) (“In fact, the records of the Convention contain absolutely no
discussion of the phrase ‘judicial Power’ . . . .”); see also Felix Frankfurter &
James Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
“Inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV.
1010, 1018 (1924) (“[T]he Constitution has prescribed very little in determining
the content . . . of judicial power.”).
97. Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary”,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2000) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 96, at 1017 (“‘Judicial power’ sums up the
whole history of the administration of justice in English and American courts
through the centuries.”).
98. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 822 (2001).
99. See FLAMM, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 8 (“In the pre-Revolutionary
American Colonies, as in England, the only accepted ground for disqualifying a
judge was pecuniary interest in a pending cause; and for years following
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matters.100 With regard to the Supreme Court in particular, the
early Congresses chose not to intervene in the Justices’ exercise
of their recusal power even after they chose to do so for the lower
federal courts.101 This practice indicates that, at the time the
Constitution was drafted, Supreme Court recusal was a matter
for the Court through its exercise of the judicial power granted to
it by Article III.
Longstanding governmental practice further corroborates
this view.102 Although the most well-known examples occur in
disputes between the Legislative and Executive Branches,103
independence American law, like that of the mother nation, admitted of very
few grounds for seeking judicial disqualification.”).
100. See, e.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605,
612 (1947) (“In the Supreme Court disqualification has always been the
prerogative of each individual Justice . . . .”).
101. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79 (regulating
only federal “judges,” rather than “justices”).
102. As Justice Frankfurter and Professor Landis explained: “The scope and
qualities of a power which has been voluminously exercised since 1789 must be
looked for in the cumulative proof of its exercise.” Frankfurter & Landis, supra
note 96, at 1018. The Court has continually relied on traditional understandings
and practices of the three Branches of government to determine the proper
constitutional balance among them. Perhaps the most well-known statement
regarding the division of authority between the Legislative and Executive
Branches is found in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, in which he articulated a three-tier system for resolving
separation of powers disputes. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson’s famous
system considered evidence of historical congressional “inertia, indifference or
quiescence” to the challenged executive action as important to understanding
the proper balance of power between the Branches. Id. at 637. Although
congressional intent regarding the conduct of a coordinate branch is difficult to
determine, its relevance in Justice Jackson’s framework highlights the
important fact for present purposes: that constitutional meaning in separation
of powers disputes can be gleaned from established governmental practices in
the contested area. Justice Frankfurter made this clear in his own Youngstown
concurrence:
In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in
the President by § 1 of Art. II.
Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
103. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); Pocket Veto
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government practice has also played an important role in
resolving conflicts between legislative and judicial power.104 In
the case of Supreme Court recusal, longstanding legislative and
judicial custom indicates that the decision to recuse a Supreme
Court Justice is not only a judicial decision, but also one that is
constitutionally protected from legislative interference.
Congress did not seek to regulate Supreme Court Justices’
recusal practices for the first 150 years of the Republic. In 1948,
Congress amended the federal recusal statute to include, for the
first time, “[a]ny justice . . . of the United States,”105 but it did not
set any procedural standards for deciding recusal questions,
disrupt the ongoing practice of judges resolving their own recusal
questions in the first instance, or address the review of those
initial decisions. With regard to the Supreme Court, the amended
statute has led to the seamless continuation of the Justices’
historical
recusal
practices—unreviewable,
individualized
determinations by each Justice of their own qualification to sit in
a particular case, without any obligation to justify or otherwise
explain their decisions. As Professor Ifill described it, “[i]t
appears that the Justices on the Court enjoy the unreviewable
power to determine individually whether and when to disqualify
themselves.”106 Nevertheless, in light of ample historical and
Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
104. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), the Court confirmed
judges’ ability to impose sanctions for bad faith conduct in the absence of any
statutes or regulations to that effect. See id. at 42, 58. The Chambers Court
explained that “[i]t has long been understood that ‘[c]ertain implied powers
must necessarily result to our Courts . . . from the nature of their institution.’”
Id. at 43 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), the
Court also relied on longstanding practice to uphold judicial power to sua sponte
dismiss for failure to prosecute despite an existing rule ostensibly requiring a
motion by defendant to trigger dismissal. See id. at 628–30.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
106. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?, supra note 45, at 620. See also R.
Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck, Duck Recuse: Foreign Common Law Guidance
and Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1799, 1813–14 (2005) (“The ‘historic practice’ of the United States Supreme
Court has always been to refer motions for recusal to the Justice whose
disqualification is sought. Thus . . . the actual procedure by which the decision is
made is truly a creature of tradition.”).

1566

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

modern evidence of the Court’s erratic and at times seemingly
unprincipled recusal decisions, Congress has not taken any
definitive steps to enforce its statutory requirements or to
indicate that it considers the Court’s ongoing recusal practices
problematic.107 This acquiescence or indifference to Supreme
Court recusal practice is evidence of the Justices’ constitutional
authority to decide recusal questions independently.108
The Justices’ longstanding practices suggest a similar
constitutional interpretation. Prior to the recusal statute being
amended to include them, several of our most esteemed Justices
made highly controversial recusal decisions without any
interference or objection from Congress.109 A similar pattern
emerged after the statute was amended, as the Justices
continued to make controversial decisions that were at best
tangentially faithful to the statutory standard.110 In their
memoranda in Laird111 and Cheney,112 respectively, Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia relied heavily on extrastatutory factors in
justifying their decisions not to recuse.113 They cited the Justices’
individual power to make recusal decisions,114 the recusal
107. But see Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862,
112th Cong. (2011) (proposing substantive and procedural overhaul of Supreme
Court recusal).
108. The instant example of the Justices retaining dominion over their own
recusal decisions despite congressional action to the contrary provides even
stronger support for the Supreme Court’s exclusive power over recusal than
evidence of judicial power in the absence of legislative activity. See generally
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
109. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text (describing controversial
recusal decisions by Chief Justices Marshall and Stone and Justices Holmes and
Black).
110. The Court has never taken a case in which it has applied the federal
recusal statute to one of its own members. See Bassett, supra note 17, at 676–80
(outlining the “four major opinions touching on section 455,” all of which dealt
with recusal decisions by a lower court judge).
111. 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
112. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
113. See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915−29 (2004)
(giving Justice Scalia’s reasons for nonrecusal); Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824,
824−39 (1972) (explaining Justice Rehnquist’s reasons for denying the motion to
recuse).
114. See Laird, 409 U.S. at 833 (reminding the reader that “under the
existing practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter of individual
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precedents of other Justices,115 and the Court’s unique
institutional features—such as its lack of substitute Justices and
the problems created when it issues equally divided decisions116—
to support their conclusion that the Justices should employ an
effective presumption against recusal.117 These memoranda
decision”).
115 See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 924−26 (citing decisions by Justices White and
Jackson not to recuse themselves despite their close friendships with highranking members of the Administration); Laird, 409 U.S. at 829–30, 31
(explaining that “different Justices who have come from the Department of
Justice have treated the same or very similar situations differently” from one
another, and Justice Rehnquist’s “impression is that none of the former Justices
of this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves” in
analogous cases). It is worth noting that one of the decisions that Justice Scalia
cited as useful precedent occurred before the federal recusal statute was
amended to include Supreme Court Justices.
116. See Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (identifying the potential problem of a “tie
vote [leaving the Court] unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented
by the case”); id. at 916 (explaining that recusal is “effectively the same as
casting a vote against the petitioner”). Some proponents of congressional reform
of Supreme Court recusal, including H.R. 862, the recent proposal introduced in
the House, have suggested using circuit court judges to review Supreme Court
recusal decisions. See Supreme Court Transparency Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R.
862, 112th Cong. (2011). While such an arrangement may appeal to those
concerned with the ethical ramifications of current Supreme Court recusal
practices, there are significant constitutional problems with such an
arrangement, including Article III’s mandates that there be only “one supreme
Court,” and that Congress have power to create only “inferior courts.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. Justice Rehnquist made the identical argument in another
memorandum explaining a decision not to recuse himself in Microsoft v. United
States:
Finally, it is important to note the negative impact that the
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our
Court. Here—unlike the situation in a District Court or a Court of
Appeals—there is no way to replace a recused Justice. Not only is the
Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine Members, but
the even number of those remaining creates a risk of affirmance of a
lower court decision by an equally divided court.
530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000).
117. More specifically, Justice Rehnquist argued that a Supreme Court
Justice has an “even stronger” “duty to sit where not disqualified,” Laird, 409
U.S. at 837, and as such Justices should not “bend [] over backwards” to recuse
themselves. Id. at 838; see also Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915 (rejecting the federal
recusal statute’s presumption in favor of recusal because the “Supreme
Court . . . is different”). Justice Scalia added a warning that recusal would
“harm the Court” by encouraging the use of recusal as a means of influencing
the outcome of cases before the Court. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 927 (expressing

1568

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

reveal the Justices’ general disregard for the statutory recusal
standards. Although both Justices referred to the statutory text
in their analyses, they did not employ any of the traditional tools
of statutory interpretation; they did not parse the statutory
language, attempt to divine congressional intent, examine
legislative history, or evaluate lower court interpretations of the
statute. Apparently, neither Justice thought of their analysis as
primarily statutory, but instead as a broader, independent
examination of their fitness to participate in the case at hand.118
The Court’s 1993 “Statement of Recusal Policy”119 confirms
the Justices’ commitment to independent, extrastatutory recusal
decisions. The Policy claimed to apply the relevant statute, but
ultimately relied on institutional concerns to read it very
narrowly.120 As Professor Bassett observed, the Court’s Recusal
Policy “re-emphasized [the Justices’] negative view of recusal” by
“simply reflect[ing] the Justices’ own sense of what to them would
constitute a reasonable basis upon which to question a judge’s
impartiality and appl[ying] that standard across the board.”121
Justices Breyer and Kennedy reinforced the idea that the
Supreme Court feels ultimately unrestrained in its recusal
practice, and that this feeling may be constitutionally justified,
during their congressional testimony in April of 2011,122 and
concern that recusal in the instant case would effectively “give elements of the
press a veto over participation of any Justices who had social contacts with . . . a
named official,” and encourage “so-called investigative journalists to suggest
improprieties and demand recusals”).
118. This is particularly noteworthy in the case of Justice Scalia, whose well
documented views on statutory interpretation seek to avoid, seemingly at all
costs, policy-based analyses of statutory issues. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (“[T]he main danger in
judicial interpretation . . . of any law . . . is that the judges will mistake their
own predilections for the law.”).
119. See Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 43, App. D, at 1101–03.
120. See id. at 1103 (citing as support for its position the fear of strategic
recusal motions, “the possibility of an even division on the merits of a case,” and
a “distorting effect on the certiorari process” in cases where recusal occurs).
121. Bassett, supra note 17, at 681 (quoting Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Judicial
Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 625, 626 (2002)).
122. See 79 U.S.L.W. 2389, 2389 (Apr. 19, 2011). During the hearing, Justice
Kennedy testified that “there is a constitutional problem” with making ethics
rules binding on the Court, and Justice Breyer reiterated “that it is a more
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Chief Justice Roberts did the same in his Year-End Report.123 In
sum, the Justices’ conduct and statements regarding recusal have
consistently indicated that the Court, as a matter of
constitutional practice, considers recusal an individual matter to
be decided independently by each Justice, free from congressional
interference.
Constitutional structure offers a more complex analysis, but
one that leads toward the same conclusion. There are no
provisions in Article III that limit the Court’s exercise of its
“judicial Power” over recusal. Neither of the two provisions that
are commonly thought of as qualifying the judicial power, the
provision empowering Congress to “ordain and establish” the
inferior courts,124 and the clause enabling Congress to make
“Exceptions” to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,125 have any
significant bearing on the Court’s power over recusal. The
provision accounting for congressional creation of the inferior
courts simply does not apply to the Supreme Court. The
Exceptions Clause deals only with appellate jurisdiction, which is
neither synonymous with recusal126 nor broad enough to include
cases arising under the Court’s original jurisdiction. Finally, the
Framers’ choice to empower Congress to affect Supreme Court
complex decision for Supreme Court justices to decide whether to recuse
themselves” than it is for lower court judges (who presumably are governed by
§ 455) due to a lack of replacements for the Justices. Id. at 2389, 2390.
123. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3, at 3−5 (discussing the
“fundamental difference between the Supreme Court and the other federal
courts”).
124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
126. Professor James Liebman and William Ryan have demonstrated that
the Framers did not equate judicial power with jurisdiction. See Liebman &
Ryan, supra note 96, at 708 (“We can confidently report . . . that . . . when
Article III says ‘judicial Power,’ its drafters meant just that and not, e.g.,
‘jurisdiction’ . . . .”). This is consistent with our common understanding of
judicial authority; there are many instances where judges exercise their judicial
authority that do not bear on whether the court has the power to decide the case
before it. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010)
(“‘Jurisdiction’ refers to ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority.’ Accordingly, the term
‘jurisdictional’ properly applies only to ‘prescriptions delineating the classes of
cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)’
implicating that authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 443, 455 (2004))). Recusal is precisely one of those instances.
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appellate jurisdiction suggests a countervailing intent to preclude
congressional intrusion into those exercises of the Judicial
power—like recusal—that are not expressly subjected to
congressional authority under Article III.127
The Impeachment Clauses in Article I128 are relevant to
understanding the Justices’ constitutional authority over recusal
because impeachment is the only textual authority for the
removal of Article III judges, including Supreme Court
Justices.129 This fact, however, triggers the interpretive canon of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“to state the one is to exclude
the other”); since recusal is not included along with impeachment
as one of Congress’s constitutional powers over the Judiciary, it
should not be treated as such.130 Separation of powers principles
also preclude treating the Impeachment Clauses as relevant to
the Court’s recusal powers. The severity and permanence of
impeachment and the cumbersome procedures required to
effectuate it are carefully designed to allow the Legislature to
check judicial power without unduly threatening judicial
independence.131 Permitting Congress to remove Justices from a
127. This argument evokes the interpretive canon of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (“to state the one is to exclude the other”).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
129. Congress does of course have the authority to create official positions
within the federal government that function as at-will employment (individuals
who serve at the pleasure of the President) or that expire after a term of years,
in the case of many independent agencies. In these cases, however, the
separation of powers calculus is different because the officials being removed by
means other than impeachment are not constitutionally guaranteed to hold
those offices “during good Behaviour.” Id. art. III, § 1.
130. See McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (“[I]mpeachment is the only
available remedy for clearly unethical decisions not to recuse . . . .”). That is not
to say that other issues about which the Constitution is silent, such as judicial
review, are all equally problematic. Unlike judicial power, congressional power
is carefully enumerated in eighteen clauses in Section 8 of Article I. It is
therefore easier to assume that an omission of an aspect of legislative power
from this list of eighteen sources is more significant than the exclusion of a
specific aspect of judicial power from Article III, which limits its explanation of
the authority of the federal courts to its grant of the “judicial Power” to the
Supreme Court and any “inferior courts Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
131. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (protecting judicial independence by
providing federal judges with life tenure and salary protections).
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particular case by a simple legislative mandate, rather than the
full Article I impeachment process, threatens the independence of
the Judiciary in a way not anticipated by constitutional text or
structure.132 As a result, the Impeachment Clauses should be
read in connection with Article III to support the proposition that
recusal is constitutionally distinct from impeachment, and as
such is an artifact of judicial, rather than legislative,
constitutional authority.133
The Necessary and Proper Clause134 grants Congress the
power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.”135 Unlike the provisions
previously discussed, the Necessary and Proper Clause appears,
at least facially, to grant Congress exceedingly wide latitude to
regulate all aspects of government, including the courts. When
read against the vesting clause of Article III,136 however, we see
that Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
must end where the “inherent” judicial power bestowed upon the
Court by Article III begins. If there is no realm of exclusively
judicial power under the Constitution, then the Necessary and
132. That is not to say that Congress could not constitutionally employ its
impeachment powers in an attempt to influence recusal decisions by Supreme
Court Justices. See infra Part IV.A.1.
133. Congress may still be able to influence recusal standards in the lower
courts. The point of introducing the Impeachment Clauses is simply to point out
that by defining the impeachment power and assigning it to Congress, the
Constitution’s structure offers insight into the proper constitutional home for
judicial recusal. Impeachment is the only method explicitly provided for in the
Constitution by which Congress may prevent an individual judge or Justice
from performing his or her judicial duties under Article III. We can thus infer
that the Constitution does not contemplate any additional congressional
authority in the area, especially if those additional methods would expand
congressional power to remove judges from cases at the expense of their
obligations under Article III.
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
135. Id.
136. Id. art. III, § 1 (assigning the “judicial Power of the United States” to
the Supreme Court). Of course Article III also bestows the “judicial Power” on
any “inferior courts that Congress may . . . establish,” but because the lower
federal courts are not the subject of this analysis, the present discussion will
focus solely on the inherent power of the Supreme Court. Id.
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Proper Clause renders Congress supreme among the three
Branches of government. Because the absolute supremacy of any
one branch is anathema to our constitutional system,137 there
must be some area of judicial power that belongs exclusively to
the Justices.138 The specific issue pertaining to Supreme Court
recusal is thus whether the Necessary and Proper Clause
empowers Congress to regulate the Court’s recusal practices, or
whether recusal is within the Court’s “inherent power” under
Article III such that Congress (along with other governmental
entities outside the Court) is precluded from doing so.139
137. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 264 (James Madison) (Colonial
Press ed., 1901) (“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”).
138. The Court has confirmed this idea on several occasions throughout its
history. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (“‘[W]e do
not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established
principles’ such as the scope of a court’s inherent power.” (quoting Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))); Michaelson v. United States ex rel.
Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924)
(explaining that the inherent contempt power of the courts cannot be “abrogated
nor rendered practically inoperative” by Congress); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871) (explaining the importance of maintaining
the separation of powers); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812) (“Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice
from the nature of their institution.”).
139. The President and lower federal courts have no constitutional basis for
asserting authority over Supreme Court recusal. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(describing all federal courts other than the Supreme Court as “inferior” and
therefore without power to command the Supreme Court); see also discussion
infra note 155 (discussing the President’s lack of constitutional authority over
recusal at the Court). The Judicial Conference of the United States Code of
Conduct for United States Judges also does not apply to Supreme Court
Justices. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, INTRODUCTION,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/codesofconduct/codecon
ductunitedstatesjudges.aspx (“This Code applies to United States circuit judges,
district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal Claims
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges.”). A broader consideration of
whether recusal in the federal court system as a whole (including the lower
federal courts) was part of the inherent judicial power vested by Article III
would also need to consider the Tribunals Clause of Article I, by which Congress
is expressly empowered “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9. The Tribunals Clause, especially when read
in conjunction with Article III’s vesting of the judicial power in “one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
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The precise boundaries of the Court’s inherent power remain
an open question, but a narrow consensus has emerged among
commentators and the courts around the central features of that
power. In addition to concurring that some inherent judicial
power exists, there is widespread agreement that this power
must at least include the ability to independently and completely
decide individual cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.140 As a court of last resort, and one that is singled
out in the text of Article III as unique among the federal courts as
a whole,141 the Supreme Court provides the strongest
constitutional case for retaining the inherent power to decide
cases properly before it. Even when viewed in light of this
and establish,” is evidence that lower federal courts’ grant of the judicial power
is subject to greater congressional control than that of the Supreme Court. Id.
art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (the Tribunals Clause). The issue is,
however, beyond the scope of this analysis, which is only concerned with recusal
at the Supreme Court.
140. As Professor James Liebman and William Ryan explained:
[T]he judicial Power means the Article III judge’s authority and
obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred,
independently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case . . . .
By independently, finally, and effectually decide, we mean
dispositively to arrange the rights and responsibilities of the parties
on the basis of independently developed legal reasons, subject to
review only by a superior Article III court. By case, we mean a court
action that can be resolved on the basis of enforceable law, and by
whole case, we mean not only the construction of applicable
provisions of law but also their actual application to the facts to reach
a decision.
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 96, at 771 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Caminker, supra note 97, at 1519 (“[T]he core of
the judicial power . . . is the authority to adjudicate and resolve Article III cases
and controversies.”); David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power
Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 84–86 (stating that the
vesting clause of Article III is “self-executing” with regard to issues of “judicial
potency,” which includes the power to “adjudicate claims”); Frankfurter &
Landis, supra note 96, at 1020 (explaining that Congress’s authority does not
extend to regulation of fundamental features of courts such as the authority to
independently and finally decide cases); Pushaw, supra note 98, at 741 (“[T]he
constitutional provisions concerning congressional regulation of the judiciary do
not pertain to the courts' exercise of their essential function of adjudication.”).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting “[t]he judicial Power . . . in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish”).
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(limited) understanding of inherent judicial power, Supreme
Court recusal, at least the substantive standards for determining
whether recusal is warranted,142 falls within the core of inherent
judicial power under Article III. Because recusal precludes an
individual Justice from participating in a case, the power to
mandate recusal is the power to prevent any number of
Justices—up to and including the entire Court—from exercising
the core judicial function of deciding individual cases. A
mandatory recusal statute could thus result in there not being
enough Justices to decide a case that is otherwise properly before
the Court. This would represent an unconstitutional intrusion
into a core judicial power that is possible in every instance in
which Congress seeks to provide substantive recusal standards
for the Court.143 The Necessary and Proper Clause is thus not a
valid source of congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal
because it has the significant potential to interfere with the
power to decide cases that is inherent and exclusively vested in
the Court by Article III.144
142. There is one aspect of recusal regulation that does not fall as neatly
within the Court’s inherent power to decide cases—procedural rules. There is a
stronger argument to be made that congressional promulgation of procedural
requirements for the Supreme Court’s recusal decisions do not interfere with the
exceedingly narrow definition of inherent power advanced here. This fact does
not, however, change the significance of the present inquiry or its relevance to
the question of how a separation of powers analysis can help identify the most
effective and constitutionally sound resolution to the current impasse over
recusal at the Court. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1223–25 (addressing the
merits of procedural reform as a means of resolving the inter-branch impasse
over recusal).
143. The most common arguments in favor of congressional power over
recusal—that Congress could build in exceptions or “fixes” to the recusal
statute, that Congress can regulate recusal because it has control over the size
and qualifications of the Court, or that Congress can regulate recusal because it
has power over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction all fall short when confronted
with this inherent power argument. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1221–22
(identifying the weaknesses in all three of the above arguments defending
congressional involvement in Supreme Court recusal).
144. Because at first blush this argument may seem to beg questions about
the constitutionality of more significant practices like judicial review, it is worth
taking a moment to explain why the instant account of inherent judicial power
does not apply equally to judicial interference with any inherent legislative
authority of Congress. The answer lies in the fact that judicial review is limited
to occasions in which Congress’s exercise of its legislative authority has run
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It is not necessary that this constitutional analysis be beyond
dispute for the subsequent discussion of Congress’s constitutional
role in its current impasse with the Court over recusal. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to acknowledge that there are
legitimate constitutional questions about Congress’s authority to
regulate recusal at the Court, and that constitutional uncertainty
contributes significantly to the broader interbranch tensions over
recusal. Those tensions include the normative question of how the
interbranch conflict over recusal should be resolved within the
context of our tripartite government.
C. Why is this Congress’s Problem?
Even if congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal
raises constitutional questions that contribute to the ongoing
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal, the
question remains: Why is this Congress’s problem? Why not focus
on the Court’s role in alleviating the impasse? The answer, like
the question, lies in the separation of powers. The separation of
powers depends, at least in part, on the political integrity of the
individual Branches and the quality of the relationships among
them. Any resolution to the interbranch conflict over recusal
should therefore seek to promote a sense of responsibility and
comity on behalf of both Congress and the Court.145 When viewed
afoul of a constitutional provision or mandate. Congress’s power over the
Judiciary under the Necessary and Proper Clause is not similarly limited, nor
would it be the sole prerogative of the Legislature to establish when the
Judiciary has run afoul of the Constitution even in cases in which Congress
sought to prevent a constitutional violation; it is, after all, “emphatically the
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” Marbury
v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
145. Professor Paulsen uses the term “coordinacy” to describe the same
concept:
The “coordinacy” of the three branches of the federal government is
one of the fundamental political axioms of our federal
Constitution. . . . This does not mean that the branches are equal in
the quantum of powers assigned to them. . . . Coordinacy is a term of
power-relationship, not of power-scope. . . . It is the idea of coordinacy,
even more than the cognate concept of separation on which it depends
and builds, that fuels the system of “checks and balances” that guards
against “a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in
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in this light, it becomes clear that although the Court possesses
the constitutional authority to resolve the recusal conflict, the
mechanisms at its disposal are far more potentially damaging to
the Court as an institution and to our constitutional system in
general than those available to Congress.
The Court has at least three measures at its disposal to
resolve its impasse with the Legislative Branch over recusal,
none of which are ultimately satisfactory when considered in
light of the separation of powers. One is to state openly and
explicitly that it will not comply with any statutory mandates
regarding recusal because of constitutional concerns, issues of
judicial integrity, or some other institutional reason. This
approach would bring transparency and accountability to the
Court’s position and would alleviate concerns that the Court is
eluding statutory standards for some less compelling reason like
political gain or mere convenience. This approach has, however,
some considerable weaknesses in the context of the separation of
powers. For one, without grounding its statement in legally
binding authority, the Court could be made to look more
obstinate than it would in the absence of a public statement.
More importantly, a public statement of noncompliance may
exacerbate, rather than help resolve, the conflict. Chief Justice
Roberts’s Year-End Report, which is the closest example to date
of a public explanation of the Court’s views on the recusal
impasse, provoked a largely negative reaction. It prompted a
letter from five Senators asking the Court to voluntarily adopt
formal recusal standards.146 Professors Yeomans and Schwartz
argued that “Chief Justice John Roberts’s response in his yearend report to the increasing controversy over the ethics of
Supreme Court Justices served to drive home the need for the
high court to adopt reforms immediately,”147 and Professor Ifill
characterized his statement as “far short of an adequate
the same hands.”
Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29; see also, e.g., Jonathan L. Entin, Separation
of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 175, 226 (1990) (“[T]he separation of powers assumes a minimum level of
interbranch comity.”).
146. See Senator Letter, supra note 4.
147. Yeomans & Schwartz, supra note 4.
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response,” primarily because it did not increase the “transparency
of [recusal] procedures that go to the very legitimacy of the
Court’s decisionmaking.”148 These critiques highlight the
shortcomings of any mere statement by the Court that it will not
comply with statutory recusal standards. In the current debate
over recusal, an explanation of the status quo—even one based on
high-minded principles like the separation of powers or
institutional competence—will simply not suffice.149
Alternatively, the Court could use its power as the final
expositor on the Constitution to rule that the impasse between
Congress and the Court over recusal is not legally justiciable.
This relatively common approach in separation of powers cases
often leads to positive results. The War Powers Resolution,150 for
instance, has long been a source of interbranch controversy. A
debate has persisted for decades regarding whether the
Resolution is a constitutional limit on the President’s authority to
use military force as Commander in Chief under Article II.151
Although several members of Congress have expressed concern
about various presidential decisions in relation to the War
Powers Resolution,152 there have never been any attempts to
judicially enforce it against the President,153 and several
148. Ifill, The Chief Strikes Out, supra note 4.
149. See id. (“I found Justice Roberts’ defense of the status quo in the
Supreme Court’s recusal practice to be the most unsatisfying aspect of his
remarks.”).
150. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973).
151. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
152. Members of Congress raised concerns under the War Powers Resolution
during President Clinton’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999 and President Obama’s
bombing of Libya in 2011, and in both instances there was much public and
scholarly debate over the constitutional basis for those objections. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2001) (discussing the debate
over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution); Jack Goldsmith, War
Power: The President’s Campaign Against Libya is Constitutional, SLATE.COM
(Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2288869/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2012) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In neither
case, however, was there any serious threat of legal action by Congress to
enforce the requirements of the Resolution.
153. See CHARLES A. SHANOR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE
AND RECONSTRUCTION 208 (4th ed. 2009) (“The requirements of the War Powers
Resolution were never tested in court. . . . No judicial decision has ever
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Presidents have employed military force without strictly adhering
to its requirements or challenging the statute in court.154 But the
fact that the conflict between Congress and the Executive over
the War Powers Resolution has never been substantively
addressed by the Court does not mean that the Resolution is
constitutionally problematic. Whether it refuses to do so for
undisclosed policy reasons or because it formally concludes that
the dispute is nonjusticiable as a matter of constitutional law, the
presence of the Court as a neutral arbiter makes the lack of a
legal resolution between the other two Branches more
constitutionally palatable. A decision by the Court not to
intervene legitimizes the otherwise seemingly unruly process of
political interchange and compromise between Congress and the
President by making it part of the constitutional design, thus
creating political space for the Legislative and Executive
Branches to better deal with complex questions about the use of
military force on a case-by-case basis.
The conflict over Supreme Court recusal, however, would not
similarly benefit from a decision by the Court that it is without
constitutional power to resolve the dispute. Unlike with the War
Powers Resolution, there is no third-party mediator for the
construed the War Powers Resolution.”); see also, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203
F.3d 19, 20−23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (dismissing a case seeking to enforce the War
Powers Resolution against President Clinton on justiciability grounds), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
154. As Professor Jeffrey Tulis explained:
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress passed a
constitutionally aggressive statute, the War Powers Resolution,
which seemed to display just the sort of institutional turf protection
that the Federalist theory describes. Nevertheless, since the passage
of the Resolution, the President has violated its terms repeatedly
without challenge from Congress.
Jeffrey K. Tulis, On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility, 89 B.U. L. REV.
515, 516–17 (2009); see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 49 (1993) (“[T]hanks
to a combination of presidential defiance, congressional irresolution, and judicial
abstention, the War Powers Resolution has not worked.”); LOUIS FISHER,
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 192 (1995) (“Presidents have generally done what
they wanted to do, notwithstanding the War Powers Resolution.”); HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 39–40, 123 (1990)
(discussing the continued use of force by the Executive Branch in defiance of the
War Powers Resolution).
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interbranch conflict over recusal at the Court.155 As a result, the
same type of political exchange and compromise—such as the
Justices citing to the statute in their recusal memoranda despite
neither feeling bound by it nor applying it with the same force or
rigor as they would other statutes156—loses the imprimatur of
legitimacy that comes from direct or indirect endorsement of the
process by a coequal branch of government. Instead, the Justices’
failure to comply makes them appear unprincipled, regardless of
the true quality of their decisions. Thus, due to the seemingly
inevitable unenforceability of congressional mandates regarding
Supreme Court recusal and the absence of a constitutionally
recognized third-party arbiter, a constitutional decision by the
Court that the dispute is nonjusticiable is not a satisfactory
resolution under the separation of powers.
The third way the Court could break the impasse over the
Justices’ recusal practices is to use its power of judicial review to
invalidate the statutory recusal standards on the basis that they
are unconstitutional interferences with the judicial power vested
in the Court by Article III.157 This would amount to essentially
deleting the word “justices” from the existing statute and
returning it to its pre-1948 status, when it purported to cover all
federal judges, but not Supreme Court Justices.158 This is perhaps
155. There is no constitutional basis for the President to intervene in a
dispute between Congress and the Court over recusal, and review by any court
other than the Supreme Court would run afoul of Article III’s hierarchy of “one
Supreme Court” and other “inferior” courts. See Russell Wheeler, Regulating
Supreme Court Justices’ Ethics—“Cures Worse than the Disease?”, BROOKING
INST. (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0321_justices_
ethics_wheeler.aspx?p=1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing the
constitutional concerns surrounding proposals calling for the creation of a court
to review recusal decisions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 107–12 (considering the meaning of
Article III’s “one supreme Court” requirement in the context of reviewing
Supreme Court recusal decisions).
156. See supra notes 111–19 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s
prior practices of analyzing the federal recusal statute differently from other
statutes).
157. For a more detailed treatment of this constitutional issue, see supra
Part III.B, and see generally Virelli, supra note 11 (stating that separation of
powers principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court
recusal).
158. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (governing disqualification of Justices,

1580

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

the most intuitive response to the problem, as we generally
think—at least since Chief Justice Marshall’s famous
pronouncement in Marbury—that matters of constitutional
interpretation lie finally, and most comfortably, with the
Judiciary.159 Despite its intuitive appeal, this approach is
seriously flawed when viewed from a separation of powers
perspective.
As a general matter, Supreme Court review and invalidation
of federal statutes is an unremarkable and fundamental feature
of our constitutional existence.160 The stakes become a bit higher,
however, when the statutes under review regulate not
subordinate government actors or the public at large, but the
highest levels of a coordinate branch. In those instances,
questions of interbranch comity and cooperation become of
paramount importance to ensure the continued functioning and
legitimacy of the constitutional design. In the context of
congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal, concerns
about comity and legitimacy counsel strongly against the Court
striking the recusal statute.
Some examples illustrate the effect of comity concerns on the
Court. In Myers v. United States,161 the Court considered a
question dividing the other two Branches of government—
whether Congress could limit the President’s authority to remove
an executive official from office. The conflict had all the makings
of an impasse: a postmaster who had been removed from office
brought suit against the United States alleging that President
Wilson’s decision to fire him ran afoul of a federal statute
requiring the President to obtain “the advice and consent of the
Senate” before removal.162 The President did not claim that the
judges, and magistrate judges), with Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275,
278–79 (regulating only federal “judges,” rather than “justices”).
159. Chief Justice Marshall did, after all, famously explain in Marbury that
it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
160. But see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–29 (1962) (discussing the “countermajoritarian difficulty” with judicial review).
161. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
162. Act of July 12, 1876, § 6, as amended by 39 U.S.C. § 31 (1876).
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Senate had consented to the postmaster’s removal under the
terms of the statute, but simply that Congress was without
constitutional authority to interfere with the Executive’s
prerogative to manage its workforce. The Supreme Court took up
the issue and held that the separation of powers precluded
Congress from interfering with the President’s decision to remove
executive officers at will.163 The statute was invalidated, and
although not uncontroversial,164 the decision brought relative
clarity to both Branches. Less than a decade later, the Court
again addressed the removal issue, and held that Congress could
limit the Executive’s removal authority in the context of
independent agencies.165 Again, the Court’s conclusion was
adopted as the authoritative solution to the interbranch conflict.
Since then, the Court has addressed additional removal issues
without any challenges to its institutional authority or capacity to
do so.166 These examples show that the Court can be well-suited
to resolve disputes between Congress and the Executive, and in
fact may be an important bulwark against undue conflict between
those Branches in its role as a neutral constitutional arbiter.
The circumstances change dramatically, however, when the
Court becomes involved in constitutional review of statutes that
are targeted at the Court itself or the Justices. The most direct
example of this phenomenon is in cases that have come before the
Court under the Exceptions Clause of Article III.167 The
163. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 51 (discussing the President’s power to remove
executive officers).
164. See FISHER, supra note 154, at 60–64 (discussing Chief Justice Taft’s
decision in Myers and the subsequent reactions thereto).
165. See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935):
The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi
judicial agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties
independently of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that
authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period
during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal
except for cause in the meantime.
166. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct.
3138, 3164 (2010) (holding that the particular arrangement of “good cause”
requirements for removal of members of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board violated separation of powers principles, as the President did
not have the authority to oversee the officials within the Executive Branch).
167. The Exceptions Clause is the best example here because it is the only
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Exceptions Clause expressly empowers Congress to provide
“Exceptions” or “Regulations” regarding the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.168 The Clause is the only constitutional
provision that is aimed expressly and exclusively at the
relationship between Congress and the Supreme Court; it does
not empower any other government actor to influence the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction, and does not permit Congress to do
anything with respect to any other constituency of the Judicial
Branch. The Exceptions Clause is thus the purest analog for the
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal, and as
such provides useful insights into how the Court views its role as
constitutional interpreter differently when the Court’s own
institutional interests are at stake.
The Court’s Exceptions Clause jurisprudence is the subject of
longstanding debate, but one feature of that jurisprudence—and
the most important feature for present purposes—is clear: The
Court has never invalidated a statute solely on the basis that it
overstepped Congress’s authority under the Exceptions Clause.
The Court has upheld congressional authority in all but one case
interpreting the Clause, albeit often narrowly and without
conceding that the Court’s jurisdiction is entirely precluded.169 In
constitutional provision that gives Congress authority over just the Supreme
Court and not the other parts of the Judicial Branch. There are of course
other—in fact significantly more common—instances in which the Court
engages in judicial review of statutes that raise conflicts between the Legislative
and Judicial Branches. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835−36 (1986)
(resolving whether the statutory authorization of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to adjudicate certain claims unconstitutionally interfered
with the authority of Article III judges). In terms of drawing analogies to the
impasse over Supreme Court recusal, it is important to focus on the relationship
not between Congress and the federal courts in general, but Congress and the
Supreme Court. While there may be reasons of comity and legitimacy that
prevent the Court from resolving disputes between the Legislature and the
Judiciary as a whole, those problems are magnified significantly when the
Court’s decision deals solely with its own authority vis-à-vis Congress. Because
the instant analysis focuses solely on recusal practices at the Supreme Court, it
is more instructive to draw analogies from equally narrow conflicts. The only
constitutional conflict that is as narrow as—and is thus properly analogized to—
Supreme Court recusal is the conflict between Congress and the Court under
the Exceptions Clause.
168. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
169. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 652 (1996) (upholding a federal
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the lone case in which the Court did strike a statute under the
Exceptions Clause, United States v. Klein,170 the Court went to
great lengths to offer alternative explanations for its holding.
Klein struck down a statute that required the Court to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction any suit to recover proceeds from property
seized during the Civil War in which the claimant’s entitlement
to the property was based on a presidential pardon. The Court
importantly acknowledged Congress’s power to limit the Court’s
appellate jurisdiction.171 It then declared the statute
unconstitutional on the grounds that it impermissibly attempted
to direct the outcome of specific cases in violation of the judicial
power vested in the Court by Article III,172 and interfered with
the President’s pardoning power under Article II.173 Taken
statute against an Exceptions Clause challenge); Ex parte Yeager, 75 U.S. 85,
106 (1869) (same); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514−15 (1869) (same).
170. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
171. See id. at 145 (“If it simply denied the right of appeal in a particular
class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of
the power of Congress to make ‘such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction’
as should seem to it expedient.”).
172. The Klein Court explained that:
[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great
and controlling purpose is to deny to pardons granted by the
President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have. . . .
It is evident from this statement that the denial of jurisdiction to this
court . . . is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in
causes pending, prescribed by Congress. . . . It seems to us that this is
not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make
exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power. The
court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and
thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by
dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way? . . . We must think that
Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the
legislative from the judicial power.
Id. at 145–47.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States.”). The
Klein Court went on to explain that:
The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the
effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the
Executive. . . . To the executive alone is intrusted the power of
pardon; and it is granted without limit. . . . Now it is clear that the
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together, the Court’s Exceptions Clause jurisprudence
demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to assert its own interests
over those of Congress. It has generally affirmed Congress’s
authority to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction,174 and even
when it found it necessary to invalidate a statute it relied heavily
on the countervailing interests of the Executive in doing so.175
The purpose of the Exceptions Clause example is not to take
a position as to the quality of the Court’s reasoning or conclusions
in those cases. It is offered rather as support for the narrow
proposition that the Court exercises its power of judicial review
more cautiously when addressing conflicts between itself and
another branch of government, as in the Supreme Court recusal
context. While the Exceptions Clause analogy is a strong one, it is
limited both by its relatively small number of cases and the fact
that there are no corroborating examples, primarily because no
other constitutional provisions single out the Court as the sole
subject of regulation. Nevertheless, a normative analysis of the
Court’s approach to resolving conflicts between itself and the
other Branches confirms the impression left by the Court’s
Exceptions Clause cases, and counsels strongly against the Court
using its power of review to overturn the recusal statute.
As an initial matter, cooperation and comity among the
coordinate Branches of government are necessary to the effective
functioning of our tripartite constitutional arrangement.176 The
Branches are coequal and necessarily interactive,177 and
legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than
the executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision
under consideration. . . . This certainly impairs the executive
authority and directs the court to be instrumental to that end.
Klein, 80 U.S. at 147–48.
174. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 654 (stating that the Act at issue did not violate
the Exceptions Clause); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513 (stating that the
Constitution gives Congress the power to “‘mak[e] exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court’” (citation omitted)).
175. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 147–48 (discussing the potential infringement on
the power granted by the Constitution to the Executive).
176. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29 (describing the need for
coordinacy among the three Branches of the federal government); Entin, supra
note 145, at 226 (explaining that “[t]he separation of powers assumes a
minimum level of interbranch comity”).
177. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997) (“[O]ur . . . system
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collaborate on nearly every issue of national importance such as
the national budget, military readiness and deployment, social
policy questions, and law enforcement initiatives. Although each
branch is equipped with powerful constitutional checks designed
to maintain a sense of equilibrium and balance within the federal
structure, the use of those checks in a confrontational or
unwelcome way may exchange short-term gains for long-term
damage to governmental efficiency and productivity. For this
reason alone, the Court should be cautious in exercising its
powers of judicial review, especially in the context of resolving
disputes in favor of one branch of government over another. As
Professor Bruce Peabody and John Nugent explained:
[W]e do not suggest that the judiciary should never intervene
in separation of powers conflicts. But we do think this
intervention should be infrequent [and] restrained . . . . The
judiciary should, to the best of its ability, resist efforts to
become embroiled in interbranch disputes while they are still
unfolding. . . . [W]hen the judiciary does intervene in
disagreements over the authority or powers of the different
divisions of government, it should . . . address how its ruling
will affect the various levels at which the separation of powers
operate.178

The remaining normative arguments against the Court
striking the recusal statute are perfectly in line with the concerns
expressed by proponents of recusal reform—protection of the
Court’s public reputation and, in turn, its legitimacy as the final
expositor of constitutional law. As Justice O’Connor explained,
“The Court’s power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of
imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of
interdependence as well as independence the absence of which ‘would preclude
the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’” (citation
omitted)); id. at 703 (“As Madison explained, separation of powers does not
mean that the Branches ‘ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over
the acts of each other.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 266 (James
Madison) (Colonial Press ed., 1901))); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”).
178. Bruce G. Peabody & John D. Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the
Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2003).
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substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s
law means and to declare what it demands.”179 She went on to
explain that “[t]he underlying substance of this legitimacy . . . is
expressed in the Court’s opinions, and our contemporary
understanding is such that a decision without principled
justification would be no judicial act at all.”180 Striking the
portion of the recusal statute that governs the Justices invites
criticism that the Court is aggrandizing power at the expense of
at least one of the political Branches. This criticism, especially
when combined with parallel critiques that the Court is becoming
overly politicized,181 could undermine public confidence in the
institution and its fitness not only to adjudicate, but also to fulfill
its role under the separation of powers as a check on the other
Branches. The Court’s legitimacy could be similarly imperiled by
a decision striking regulations on Supreme Court recusal if such
a decision appeared unprincipled. Particularly in an area such as
Supreme Court recusal and the separation of powers, in which
the constitutional text, history, and judicial precedent are at best
sparse, a decision in which the Court favors its own authority
over that of another branch—even in the face of a written opinion
explaining the decision—could be seen as pretextual and thus
democratically illegitimate. Finally, the Court’s Exceptions
Clause jurisprudence provides yet another reason why the Court
should refrain from using its power of review in the debate over
recusal. Whereas application of the recusal statute could harm
litigants by precluding them from receiving an otherwise
constitutionally-provided level of judicial review in a single
case,182 the application of a jurisdiction-stripping statute is
almost certainly more likely to bar review in a wider array of
179. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865
(1992).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting recent critiques of the
Justices’ political associations and interactions).
182. See supra Part III.B (outlining the constitutional difficulties with
congressional influence over Supreme Court recusal based at least in part on the
fact that a recusal statute threatens to preclude the Court from exercising its
inherent authority to decide individual cases).
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cases. Nevertheless, despite their potential for harm, the Court
has been extremely reluctant to strike jurisdiction-stripping
statutes under the Exceptions Clause. To the extent that the
harmful impact on litigants of a jurisdiction stripping statute is
greater than that of a recusal statute, there is even less reason
for the Court to overturn the latter.
Because the Court cannot remedy its impasse with Congress
without doing precisely the damage to its institutional reputation
and legitimacy that proponents of recusal reform seek to avoid,
the task lies with Congress to employ the non-legislative tools at
its disposal to alleviate the interbranch tension over recusal.
IV. Congress as an Effective Constitutional Actor
The fact that regulatory approaches to Supreme Court
recusal raise constitutional concerns about the bounds of
congressional authority does not mean that Congress is without
potentially effective methods to remedy its impasse with the
Court. By viewing the question of Supreme Court recusal as a
matter of constitutional structure, we can more clearly identify
ways that Congress may legitimately exercise its non-regulatory
authority to address concerns over the Justices’ recusal practices
without the countervailing harm to judicial and congressional
legitimacy that results from regulatory intervention.
A. Congress’s Indirect Constitutional Tools
This analysis reveals five indirect constitutional approaches
for Congress to use in influencing Supreme Court recusal practice
within the confines of a legitimate tripartite governmental
structure—impeachment, procedural reform, judicial confirmation,
appropriations, and investigation.
1. Impeachment
Congress’s impeachment power is perhaps its strongest
means of curtailing perceived recusal abuses by the Justices. The
benefits of impeachment in the Supreme Court recusal context
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are its clear constitutional legitimacy as a legislative check on the
Judiciary and its effectiveness, both as a response to past recusal
misconduct and as a deterrent against future misconduct by the
Justices. First, impeachment is a valuable tool for Congress in
the recusal context because it is clear as a constitutional matter.
In fact, questions of impeachment are best understood as political
questions, dedicated exclusively to the Legislature by Article I.183
Unlike direct regulatory limits on Supreme Court recusal,
impeachment is not a separation of powers problem, but rather
an anticipated and explicitly prescribed potential solution.
Impeachment is also attractive because of the nature of the
remedy; by removing a Justice from office, any future problems
with that Justice’s recusal practices will be alleviated. It likewise
stands to reason that the specter of impeachment will work as a
deterrent, encouraging Justices to conform their recusal practices
to those norms not considered impeachable by Congress.
Impeachment’s primary shortcoming in the recusal context is
its lack of constitutionally mandated criteria. The converse of
impeachment’s strong claim to legitimacy as a legislative check
on the Judiciary as an institution is the potential legitimacy
problem arising from a specific exercise of the impeachment
power over an individual Justice. Article III guarantees the
Justices their “Offices during good Behavior,”184 but that term is
otherwise undefined in the constitutional text, and Article I
provides little or no guidance as to how or when impeachment
proceedings should be instituted.185 Impeachment proceedings
against a Justice for any reason, including recusal issues, would
require significant explanation by Congress to avoid the public
perception of overreaching and to avoid the risk of lowering the
bar for the impeachment of federal judges, especially Supreme
Court Justices, to the detriment of the Judiciary’s ability to
function as a coequal branch of government. These dangers,
however, while significant, are neither unique to Congress’s
183. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that challenges to
the impeachment process are non-justiciable political questions).
184. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
185. One feature of impeachment proceedings that is clear from the
constitutional text is that they must initiate in the House. See id.
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exercise of the impeachment power nor fatal to impeachment’s
potential usefulness for recusal. Arbitrariness and overuse are no
more present in impeachment than in any other largely
discretionary exercise of authority under the Constitution. The
power to declare war, for example, does not come with any easily
cognizable objective legal standards limiting its application; it is
a political decision by a political branch that is checked only by
electoral and political processes.186 The President’s veto power is
a similarly discretionary act that is checked not by constitutional
restraints on the exercise of that power, but by political and
electoral checks on the President.187 Impeachment enjoys similar
political limitations, as well as the additional constraint of
requiring two separate and coordinated efforts by both Houses of
Congress.188 By dividing the power of removal through
impeachment between the two Houses, impeachment is better
protected from abuse and overuse than other discretionary
constitutional acts. Finally, the lack of demonstrable standards
does not make impeachment impossible to employ as a productive
and valuable, even if rarely used, tool for influencing Supreme
Court recusal. Federal judicial impeachment has rarely been used
by past Legislatures.189 There is no reason to believe that future
Congresses will have difficulty deciding how impeachment may
be used to affect the Justices’ recusal decisions without unduly
damaging itself, the Court, or the separation of powers more
generally. In fact, the severity of the impeachment remedy may
cause it to be used even more sparingly. In short, because
impeachment is constitutionally dedicated to Congress and holds
substantial promise as an effective (if rarely used) remedy, it
remains a viable tool for congressional involvement in the debate
over Supreme Court recusal.

186. See id. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (giving Congress the power “[t]o declare [w]ar”).
187. See id. art I, § 7. The possibility of a congressional override is of course
a check on the effectiveness of the President’s veto power, but not on his
constitutional authority to choose to issue the veto in the first instance.
188. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl.5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
189. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND
REMOVAL 29–30 (1993) (noting that since the Founding, only eleven judges have
been tried in impeachment proceedings, and only seven have been convicted).

1590

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)
2. Procedural Reform

A second example of congressional authority over the
Justices’ recusal practices lies in Congress’s authority to
promulgate procedural requirements for the federal courts. The
operative word in this category is procedural in light of the
working assumption that the separation of powers precludes
direct congressional regulation of the Justices’ substantive
recusal decisions. With that caveat in mind, there are several
ways in which Congress could seek to regulate Supreme Court
procedure. The first is through the Exceptions Clause of Article
III. The Exceptions Clause could be used by Congress to regulate
or “strip” appellate jurisdiction from the Court in cases in which,
for instance, a certain number of recusals occurred, or conversely
in which a certain number of recusal motions were denied. The
Exceptions Clause could thereby serve as an incentive to
encourage or discourage recusals, as Justices would
presumptively be less likely to recuse when doing so would
imperil the Court’s jurisdiction over a case, and more likely to do
so when it would not.190 Nevertheless, although theoretically
straightforward under Article III, use of the Exceptions Clause is
not uncontroversial, especially when, as in the above recusal
examples, it could effectively eviscerate the Court’s otherwise
valid appellate jurisdiction. The Court’s Exceptions Clause
jurisprudence has never upheld a statute that has the effect of
closing off Supreme Court review altogether, and there are
potential separation of powers problems associated with Congress
taking that step.191 Moreover, stripping jurisdiction in reaction to
the denial of motions to recuse could incentivize meritless recusal
motions by litigants who were successful below. An additional
requirement aimed to remedy this problem, for instance counting
190. The precise opposite motivations could also be true, namely when a
Justice who is not enamored of a case could base their recusal decision at least
in part on how that decision would affect the case’s viability, but I think this is a
far less likely scenario, especially when the alternative is to vote on the merits
of the case.
191. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.2, at 182 (5th
ed. 2007) (explaining that congressional attempts to limit the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction have “never . . . been interpreted as precluding all Supreme Court
review”).
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only nonfrivolous motions to recuse in the jurisdictional analysis,
highlights another problem with the use of the Exceptions Clause
to influence recusal at the Court—the ultimate unenforceability
of the standards. As long as the Court remains the final word on
the Exceptions Clause, and there is no constitutional basis to
conclude that it would not, Congress’s authority to limit the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction remains dependent on the Court’s
own reading of the Clause. While the Court would not lightly
strike such a statute,192 it may attempt to protect some measure
of its own authority (and litigants’ access to it) through the same
statutory interpretation and constitutional line-drawing
techniques it has employed in prior Exceptions Clause cases.193
Finally, the Exceptions Clause is under-inclusive in the recusal
context because it cannot reach cases involving the Court’s
original jurisdiction.
One possible counter to the Exceptions Clause’s underinclusiveness is Congress’s power over the Court’s quorum
requirements. Quorum standards are not limited to cases arising
under the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. They also do not
necessarily pose a separation of powers problem.194 Quorum
values could be used to either encourage or discourage recusals. A
high quorum requirement would likely encourage participation
192. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing the importance of interbranch comity and cooperation to the constitutional separation of powers).
193. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (interpreting a
jurisdiction-stripping statute to still permit appellate review on alternative
statutory grounds); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) (employing the
alternate basis for appellate jurisdiction suggested in McCardle).
194. Quorum standards are less likely to create separation of powers
problems when they do not set minimum participation requirements for the
Justices that are unattainable, either due to the number of Justices currently
sitting on the Court, or the total number of Justices authorized to serve. For
example, quorum requirements almost certainly would create a separation of
powers problem if they set the minimum number of Justices required to decide a
case as higher than the total number of Justices authorized to sit on the Court
(envision a quorum requirement of 10 on the present Court). A similar problem
would arise if the quorum number was greater than the number of Justices
available to serve at any one time, due to an unfilled vacancy or a prolonged
absence. In those instances, I would argue that Congress has a constitutional
duty to either lower the quorum requirements or to fill the existing vacancies by
confirming additional Justices in order to honor the Article III requirement that
there be “one supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

1592

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

and a lower number could decrease the perceived cost of a
Justice’s decision to recuse. While they are limited by the fact
that the substantive decision to recuse is ultimately left to the
Justices themselves, and as such permits easy circumvention of
any quorum requirements,195 the absence of regulatory recusal
standards at minimum makes the Justices accountable for a
decision to circumvent quorum in a way they were not under a
regulatory recusal regime.
Finally, Congress could require that the Justices follow
specific procedural steps in making and issuing their recusal
decisions under its traditional, inherent power to regulate the
procedures of the federal courts.196 Procedural reforms, like a
requirement that the Justices publish explanations of their
recusal decisions, or that those decisions be subject to review by
the entire Court, are popular among reformers concerned about
the public perception and legitimacy of the Court,197 and
admittedly are less susceptible to constitutional arguments
invoking the separation of powers than substantive recusal
requirements.198 This does not, however, mean that procedural
requirements are without limitations. The suggested procedural
reforms are not only ultimately unenforceable against the
Justices, but their anticipated benefits may also be diminished by
the absence of parallel substantive reforms.199 If the Court is
195. This is precisely what happened in North American Co. v. SEC, 327
U.S. 686 (1946). Chief Justice Stone originally recused himself from the case,
only to reverse his decision and participate when he realized his recusal could
defeat a quorum.
196. This authority could also be grounded in the Necessary and Proper
Clause of Article I, Section 8, but, for these purposes, the precise constitutional
basis is unimportant. It is adequate for the present discussion to acknowledge
that Congress retains constitutional authority to influence—at least to some
degree—the procedures of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court.
197. See discussion supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing
the criticism of current Supreme Court recusal practices and the suggestions for
various types of reform).
198. See Virelli, supra note 11, at 1223–25 (discussing potential methods of
procedural recusal reform).
199. To the extent supporters of statutory procedural recusal reform value
the potential symbolic or persuasive effects of those reforms on the Supreme
Court, any such benefit is arguably outweighed by the costs of creating a
seemingly irresolvable conflict between two Branches of government.
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constitutionally protected from congressional interference in
deciding whether a Justice will ultimately be recused from a case,
the procedural framework in which that decision is made is not
likely to shed significantly more light on that decision. For
example, requirements that Justices publish their reasons for
failing to recuse themselves could, in the absence of defined,
binding criteria for recusal decisions, do little to promote the
integrity or public perception of the Court because there will be
no baseline against which to measure the quality of the Justice’s
explanations. It is also difficult to imagine how, in cases where a
Justice would not voluntarily choose to publicly explain their
decision, an unenforceable reporting requirement would result in
anything more than a cursory statement by the Justice. A similar
problem arises if the procedural requirement consists of the full
Court reviewing an individual decision of one of its members. As
evidenced by the fact that only once in its history has the Court
experienced a public dispute between its members over recusal,200
it is unlikely that internal Court review of its members’ recusal
decisions would lead to any useful insight into either the decision
under review or the Court’s feelings about recusal more broadly.
Nevertheless, even if procedural reforms do not drastically
change the outcome of individual recusal decisions, they can
serve to increase the transparency of the process by either
increasing the amount of substantive information provided by the
Justices in their recusal decisions, or, at minimum, shifting
responsibility for providing that information (and thus blame for
not providing it) from Congress to the Justices.
Procedural reform is an example of an indirect constitutional
tool that is far greater than the sum of its parts. Despite the
limitations of each of the proposed reforms, the impact of
procedural reform in general offers potentially significant
benefits in terms of transparency and accountability, both of
which could enhance the Court’s public perception and legitimacy

200. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers,
325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“There is no authority known
to me under which a majority of this Court has power under any circumstances
to exclude one of its duly commissioned Justices from sitting or voting in any
case.”).

1594

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

without the expense of the constitutional impasse created by
direct congressional regulation of recusal standards.
3. Judicial Confirmation
The Senate’s power over judicial confirmations is another
means by which Congress can influence Supreme Court recusal.
Unlike its legislative authority, which is limited by Article I as
well as competing constitutional provisions, the Senate’s power to
confirm is seemingly unconstrained as a constitutional matter.201
Moreover, Supreme Court confirmation hearings have become
increasingly detailed and substantive. As Professors Lori
Ringhand and Paul Collins demonstrated in their exhaustive
empirical study of the last seven decades of Supreme Court
confirmation hearings, “it is evident there was a steady increase
in the amount of dialogue that transpires at the hearings” since
1939, and “substantive issues . . . have long dominated the
hearings.”202 There is also no reason to believe that Senators’
questions regarding a nominee’s views on recusal would not be
answered. Although many of the Senators’ inquiries about
specific and controversial areas of the law are met with generic
and noncommittal responses by the nominee in order to avoid
appearing as if they have prejudged issues that could come before
the Court, questions about a potential Justice’s views on judicial
recusal would be largely immune from such an objection. Recusal
questions are technically not the subject of cases before the
Court, as they are committed entirely to an individual Justice’s
judgment. They are more akin to questions about judicial
philosophy, which is a popular topic at confirmation hearings203
201. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating only that the President “shall
nominate, with the Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . Judges of the Supreme
Court”).
202. Lori A. Ringhand & Paul M. Collins, Jr., May It Please the Senate: An
Empirical Analysis of the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings of Supreme
Court Nominees, 1939-2009, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 589, 632–33 (2011).
203. See id. at 617–18 (“Judicial philosophy is the third most frequently
occurring issue following chatter and civil rights. Comments about judicial
philosophy, which include such things as discussions of constitutional
interpretation, stare decisis and judicial activism, constitute 12.4% of the
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and has not been treated as objectionable by the nominees; in
fact, Chief Justice Roberts’s most memorable statement from his
own confirmation hearing explained his jurisprudential
philosophy by analogizing judges to baseball umpires.204 In light
of the Chief Justice’s Year-End Report, it is clear that the Court
is equivocal about which, if any, specific standards govern their
recusal decisions. Without attempting to impose binding legal
requirements on those decisions—something I have argued here
and elsewhere would violate the separation of powers205—the
Senate could exercise its unbounded discretion over confirmation
to screen Supreme Court candidates based on their views of
Supreme Court ethics and recusal. This approach is admittedly
limited, as a candidate’s views on recusal may not be sufficient to
deny their confirmation, and questioning a nominee about recusal
would not have any legal effect on a Justice post-confirmation.
Nevertheless, by focusing at least in part on recusal at a
nominee’s confirmation hearing, the Senate could encourage both
the nominees and the public to more closely examine the recusal
issue in a way that could create pressure on the new Justice to
comport with the views expressed at their confirmation hearing.
4. Appropriations
Congress’s power of the purse is yet another potentially
useful means of legislative influence over the Court’s recusal
practices. Like many of the other indirect methods mentioned,
Congress’s appropriations power has the benefit of a clear
constitutional pedigree; there is no question that the ultimate
authority to provide funding for the coordinate Branches lies
squarely and solely with Congress.206 Appropriations are also a
comments in the dataset.”).
204. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To
Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make
the rules, they apply them. The role of the umpire and a judge is critical. They
make sure everyone plays by the rules, but it is a limited role.”).
205. See generally Virelli, supra note 11 (stating that separation of powers
principles prevent Congress from directly regulating Supreme Court recusal).
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the
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powerful source of leverage over the other Branches. Finally,
because appropriations are inherently focused on the Court as an
institution, rather than the individual Justices, Congress’s power
of the purse could be an effective way to encourage the Court to
adopt its own recusal reforms.207
There are, however, limitations on any congressional attempt
to influence Supreme Court recusal through appropriations.
Although the institutional focus of appropriations may serve as a
benefit in attempting to change the recusal practices of the Court
as a whole, appropriations are not a good way for Congress to try
and address an individual Justice’s recusal practices.
Appropriations are also limited by the fact that they do not
address the Court’s recusal practices directly; they are a source of
pressure designed to incentivize the Justices to change their
behavior in exchange for funding that likely has little or nothing
to do with that behavior. While this is not a weakness in terms of
the relevance or availability of appropriations as a source of
legislative influence, it does render the power of the purse
inferior to other approaches such as procedural reforms and even
investigations that are able to target and potentially change
specific recusal practices directly. Moreover, in the event
Congress chose to rely heavily on its appropriations power to
influence the Justices’ recusal practices, additional problems
could arise. A decision to withhold funding in order to affect
recusal could have serious consequences for the Court’s ability to
perform its constitutionally-assigned judicial function. At the
extreme, a deprivation of funding could impair the Court so
severely as to threaten the Article III requirement that there be
“one supreme Court.”208 Notwithstanding these limits, Congress’s
power of the purse is another constitutionally-recognized tool by
which Congress may influence the Justices’ conduct, and as such
is a potentially useful feature in the process of reformulating the
balance of power between Congress and the Court over recusal.
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”).
207. This would be perhaps the best of all possible outcomes, as a decision
by the Justices to voluntarily adopt clearer and more transparent recusal
practices could promote the legitimacy of the Court without disrupting the
balance of powers between the Court and Congress. See infra Part IV.B.2.
208. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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5. Investigation
Finally, Congress can use its general investigatory power209
to investigate and, more specifically, conduct public hearings on
issues of national importance. In light of the constitutional and
practical realities of Supreme Court recusal, any lasting, effective
institution-wide reform will ultimately be up to the Justices
themselves. One way for Congress to instigate such reform is to
bring additional public awareness and pressure to bear on the
Justices such that they reevaluate their own recusal practices.210
Congress’s investigatory authority is broad, and includes the
ability to question members of the Court regarding recusal.211
Congress began to explore this approach in 2011, as Justices were
asked to testify before Congress on two separate occasions about

209. This reference to “general investigatory power” is meant to contrast the
exercise of congressional power being discussed here with the power to
investigate incident to impeachment proceedings. Investigations relating to an
impeachment are part of the broader discussion of impeachment and recusal
included supra at notes 127–32 and accompanying text.
210. This is not to suggest that Congress should employ the full weight of its
investigatory authority—such as its subpoena power—on the Justices, as this
would implement questions of interbranch coordination and comity that may
themselves run afoul of the separation of powers. The investigative authority
contemplated in this section is akin to an ongoing confirmation hearing,
whereby Congress may enhance the public’s awareness and knowledge of the
Supreme Court’s recusal practices as a way of encouraging the Justices to
remain vigilant in thinking about and evaluating their recusal practices.
211. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Limits On Congress's Authority to
Investigate the President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 785 (“Although there is no
explicit textual grant of investigative power to Congress in the Constitution, the
proposition that a legislative body generally possesses investigative powers is
not controversial as a historical matter.”); Todd David Peterson, Congressional
Investigations of Federal Judges, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 (2004)
As with the testimony concerning court administration, testimony by
federal judges on policy matters directly affecting the court (as long
as it does not morph into an investigation of the judge) seems not only
to be non-problematic, but also to be essential to the preservation of
good relations between the legislative and judicial branches, and
important for the protection of the interests of the federal courts.
See also Fisher, supra note 154, at 160 (“Congress uses its investigative power to
satisfy four main purposes: to enact legislation, to oversee the administration of
programs, to inform the public, and to protect its integrity, dignity, reputation
and privileges.”).
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ethical and recusal practices at the Court.212 Following those
public appearances, and in conjunction with public pressure from
academics and the media to consider reform,213 Chief Justice
Roberts chose to dedicate nearly all of his Year-End Report to
ethical issues, including recusal. Although it is impossible to
draw a definite causal link between the increased attention to the
Justices’ recusal practices and the Chief Justice’s decision to
publicly address those practices in his annual report, at least
some connection between the two is easy to imagine. It is rational
to assume that the Court would take seriously the feelings of a
coordinate branch, especially when those feelings are
corroborated by public opinion and advocacy organizations.214
This assumption is supported by the fact that the first public
statement by the Court regarding recusal since 1993 occurred in
the wake of just this type of congressional and public pressure.
Prohibiting Congress from directly regulating the Justices’
recusal decisions does not render it constitutionally helpless in
influencing those decisions. Congress may exercise its largely
unfettered constitutional discretion to impeach, fashion
procedural standards, confirm judicial nominees, appropriate
funds, and investigate in order to protect against recusal
decisions that imperil the public’s perception of the Court and its
institutional legitimacy. Although each of these indirect
constitutional approaches is limited in its scope and potential
effectiveness with regard to individual recusal decisions,
collectively these approaches have the opportunity to create some
212. Justices Breyer and Kennedy were asked about Supreme Court ethics
and recusal standards as part of their testimony before a House subcommittee
on April 14, 2011. See Malloy, supra note 5, at 2389. Additionally, on October 5,
2011, Justices Breyer and Scalia testified about the same topic before the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See Considering the Role of Judges under the
Constitution of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th
Cong. (2011).
213. See supra notes 2–10 and accompanying text (outlining the public
media and academic scrutiny brought to bear on the recusal question in 2011).
214. The Alliance for Justice recently circulated a request for signatures for
a letter requesting the Court to take up ethical reforms on its own. See Alliance
for Justice, Supreme Court Ethics Reform, http://www.afj.org/connect-with-theissues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/judicial-ethics-prof-letter-scotus.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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normative benefits that are potentially lost in the current
impasse between Congress and the Court over recusal.
B. Political and Institutional Benefits
There are two broad categories of benefits that accrue from
shifting the conversation about Supreme Court recusal to a
constitutional framework. The first are systemic benefits, benefits
that adhere to the effectiveness of our entire tripartite system by
promoting the constitutional legitimacy and reputation of the
Court. The second are institutional benefits, which include the
substantive benefits to both litigants and the Court that arise
from the Justices retaining (at least direct) control over their own
recusal decisions.215 Rather than encouraging Congress to engage
in unenforceable and unconstitutional direct regulation of the
Justices’ recusal practices that has little if any transformative
effect on those practices, a constitutional lens highlights the other
options available to release the interbranch tension over recusal
and to create a new dynamic between the Court and Congress
(and ultimately the public) that is both constitutionally sound
and effective. The result is more and better opportunities for
lasting solutions to the impasse over recusal at the Court.
1. Systemic Benefits
The impasse over Supreme Court recusal reflects badly on
the Justices and draws into question the constitutional legitimacy
of all of their decisions, including recusal decisions. The ongoing
tension facilitated by the Court’s failure to comply with an
unenforceable congressional mandate creates a sense of
arbitrariness and overreaching on behalf of the Justices,
regardless of whether their decisions are in fact legitimate or
215. As discussed in this section as well as in supra Part IV.A, Congress has
a series of constitutional mechanisms at its disposal to influence the Court’s
recusal decisions. Nothing in this discussion of the benefits associated with the
Justices’ control over those decisions is meant to diminish or otherwise overlook
Congress’s authority in that regard. The benefits argued for here are understood
to exist alongside congressional use of its own constitutional influence.
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constitutional.216 Part of this problem stems from the fact that the
Court, as the regulated entity, is also the final word in applying
the recusal statute. Short of reading the recusal statute to create
a strong presumption in favor of recusal, a position that would
raise other constitutional problems,217 the Court invites criticism
that it is acting in a self-serving or aggrandizing manner simply
by virtue of its fulfilling its role as the governmental entity
ultimately responsible for deciding “what the law is.”218 Assigning
constitutional responsibility for alleviating the impasse over
recusal to Congress helps avoid the problems of legitimacy for the
Court that come both from an irresolvable dispute with Congress
over recusal as well as an attempt by the Court to resolve such a
dispute in its own favor.
In addition to enhancing the Supreme Court’s reputation and
legitimacy, relief from the interbranch tension over recusal could
refocus Congress on more constitutionally defensible and
appropriate activities regarding recusal. Congress’s pursuit of
indirect constitutional mechanisms represents a more effective
and cooperative use of our constitutional structure to resolve
difficult problems, and as such offers the public an example of its
federal government at work that makes sense within the
constitutional framework. The broader range of constitutional
tools at Congress’s disposal are well-suited to raise public
awareness about recusal and put the Justices on notice that their
recusal decisions—and as a result the institutional legitimacy of
216. One could argue that a reciprocal perception problem adheres for
Congress; that the ineffectiveness of the recusal statute makes Congress appear
ineffectual. While this is true in theory, I would suggest that the appearance of
arbitrariness or overreaching is far more damaging to the public perception of a
democratic institution than the perception that it is unable to enforce its own
positions, especially when the failure to enforce is due to the apparent obstinacy
of a coequal branch. As a result, the public perception problem created by the
impasse over recusal is depicted here as solely a judicial problem not because
there is no countervailing negative repercussions for Congress, but because
those repercussions are less severe and in some ways derivative of the problems
created for the Court.
217. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the constitutional limits on
congressional regulation of Supreme Court recusal). See generally Virelli, supra
note 11 (stating that separation of powers principles prevent Congress from
directly regulating Supreme Court recusal).
218. Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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the Court in general—will be subject to greater public scrutiny.
Confirmation hearings can work to create cultural change about
recusal at the Court as well as put individual Justices on specific
notice about what Congress and the public expect in terms of
fairness and consistency from the Justices. Congressional
investigations and hearings can also raise public awareness and
communicate clear messages to the Court as a whole about
recusal, which in turn may serve as incentives for internal
recusal reform. Appropriations offer further incentives for
internal recusal reform at the Court and provide a potentially
valuable opportunity for Congress and the Court to cooperate in
the best spirit of the separation of powers. The specter of
impeachment is an unlikely but powerful deterrent against the
Justices overreaching to hear cases that Congress and the public
consider them unfit to decide, and jurisdictional limitations and
procedural reforms are potentially useful ways to maintain some
additional checks on the Justices’ conduct. Even if these
mechanisms are rarely utilized, a shift by Congress to focus on
these measures creates a public image of an orderly and effective
system of checks and balances, rather than the unrestrained
exercise of personal judgment by unelected Justices.
Recognition of the proper division of constitutional
responsibility over recusal also promotes legitimacy by signaling
public trust in the integrity and professionalism of the Court.
This signal is valuable for at least two reasons. First, it is
factually accurate, at least in the majority of cases. Although
ethics and recusal at the Court have become a hotly discussed
issue, even the strongest critics of the Court’s practices concede
that in the overwhelming majority of instances in which recusal
decisions are required, the Justices either get it right or make
responsible decisions.219
219. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 642
To be fair, the low use and success rate of recusal motions probably
stems in large part from the Justices’ ability to stop a lurking conflict
of interest and voluntarily remove themselves from questionable
cases. . . . Indeed, because of this strong informal tradition of stepping
aside where appropriate without being asked, the custom of counsel
has been to refrain from seeking recusal by motion . . . .
See also McElroy & Dorf, supra note 60, at 99 (explaining that “Justices would
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Second, it facilitates a sense of interbranch comity and
respect that is essential to the integrity of a tripartite
government.220 Under the current arrangement, Congress
appears to be calling into question the legitimacy of the Court
without either the imprimatur of a binding legal standard to
initiate change or a means of addressing the unique institutional
concerns associated with Supreme Court recusal. Expressly
acknowledging the constitutional reality that the Court may, at
minimum, exercise significant discretion in its recusal decisions
promotes public understanding of, and confidence in, the
separation of powers. This argument is made even more powerful
by the fact that the benefit is available virtually free of cost. As it
currently stands, Supreme Court recusal decisions are entirely
dependent on the Justices’ individual judgment and integrity.221
Acknowledgment that the Court is the sole arbiter of its own
recusal questions (subject only to those constitutional checks
clearly assigned to Congress) could serve as a powerful
endorsement of the Court’s competence and integrity without
requiring that Congress relinquish any actual authority.
Finally, judicial procedure generally, and recusal decisions in
particular, are squarely within the expertise of the Judiciary.
Congressional acknowledgement of the Court’s greater expertise
further inspires public confidence in the Court and properly
draws focus on the Legislature’s constitutionally assigned
prerogatives for curtailing judicial power.
2. Institutional Benefits
Just as alleviating the impasse over recusal at the Court will
have systemic benefits for the overall efficacy and legitimacy of
our constitutional democracy, it may also present potential
advantages for both individual litigants and the Court. Perhaps
almost certainly recuse themselves in clear-cut conflict situations”).
220. See Paulsen, supra note 93, at 228–29 (describing the importance of
“coordinacy” among the Branches).
221. See Stempel, supra note 32, at 642 (“Supreme Court recusal practice
provides an almost unique illustration in American government of substantive
law without force when applied to a certain institution.”).
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the most obvious of these advantages is that a congressional
decision to focus on indirect constitutional influences and
formally commit substantive recusal decisions exclusively to the
Justices most accurately describes current and historic
constitutional practice. This is significant because it eliminates
any distortive effects from the current statutory regime. Under
the existing statutory standards, Congress provides the Court
with unenforceable statutory “cover” for its recusal decisions.
This discourages transparency and accountability among the
Justices, as they are free to explain their recusal decisions in the
context of the statutory standard when there is little reason to
believe they feel bound by or accountable to that standard;
although they generally cite to the governing statute when
discussing recusal, in practice the Justices seem content to rely
on extrastatutory sources and arguments to support their
conclusions.222 The statute thus provides a veil of legality over
what is, in actuality, a constitutionally assigned judicial policy
decision about whether to recuse. By lifting the statutory veil
from the Court’s recusal practices, each Justice’s recusal
decisions can be properly understood and attributed to them as
their own analysis of what is in the best interests of justice in
that case. While this may not necessarily lead to more satisfying
results in specific cases, it will more accurately focus public
attention on the correct target in evaluating the Court’s recusal
jurisprudence. This increased transparency and accountability
among the individual Justices could in turn promote internal
reform by encouraging the Justices to reexamine their views on
the proper role of recusal for themselves and the Court as an
institution.
In addition to promoting transparency in the Court’s recusal
jurisprudence, there are reasons to believe that Congress could
promote better substantive recusal practices by accepting its
proper constitutional role and foregoing attempts to directly
regulate recusal at the Court. First, stepping aside could open up
space for the Court to take greater responsibility for the recusal
222. See discussion supra notes 111–20 and accompanying text (describing
the recusal analyses proffered by then-Justice Rehnquist in Laird and Justice
Scalia in Cheney).

1604

69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1535 (2012)

issue and be more creative in seeking its own responses to public
and governmental criticism.223 Although it is unlikely, especially
in light of recent events,224 that the Court would adopt sweeping
formal reforms of its recusal practices, heightened public
awareness of the issue, coupled with the absence of a statutory
standard, may push the Justices toward more frequent
explanation of their recusal decisions or more serious
consideration of recusal questions in certain circumstances. An
incentive to engage in voluntary recusal reform may be the best
possible solution to the public discontent over Supreme Court
recusal, as it incorporates recusal reform without threatening the
balance of power between Congress and the Court.
Another outcome that seeks to achieve this balance and is
made more likely by Congress refraining from direct regulation of
recusal at the Court is the reintroduction of the Due Process
Clause into the discussion of Supreme Court recusal. Although
the separation of powers may reserve authority over recusal to
the Court alone, it does nothing to limit the scope of the Court’s
authority over its own recusal practices or to insulate the Justices
from the constitutional requirements of fairness, dignity, and
personal liberty embodied in the concept of due process.225
Moreover, because due process is a constitutionally mandated
individual right, it is uncontroversial as a separation of powers
matter because it is precisely the sort of standard that the Court
is qualified to apply and constitutionally bound to uphold.
223. A recent campaign from Alliance for Justice, a prominent public
interest group concerned with judicial ethics, took precisely this approach in an
open letter to the Court urging that the Justices voluntarily adopt recusal
reform without congressional involvement. See Letter from Twelve Reform
Organizations to the Supreme Court (Jan. 9, 2012), available at
http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-issues/supreme-court-ethics-reform/coalitionletter-to-chief-justice-roberts.pdf.
224. See 2011 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 3 (explaining why Supreme
Court Justices must exercise their own independent judgment in making
recusal decisions); Chief Justice Letter, supra note 13 (“[F]or the reasons
explained in my year-end report, the Court does not plan to adopt the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges.”).
225. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(describing the concept of due process as “the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society”).
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Finally, the elimination of direct congressional influence over the
recusal process leaves that process with the Court. By virtue of
their experience and training alone, the Justices possess greater
institutional competence than Congress in fashioning effective
recusal standards.
In sum, treating Supreme Court recusal as a constitutional
question governed by the principle of separation of powers offers
significant systemic and institutional benefits. It promotes public
confidence in the Court as well as transparency and
accountability among the Justices by shaping the legal
framework to better reflect constitutional practice. It also has
potential to improve the Justices’ decision making in the area by
incentivizing them to consider their own recusal practices and to
incorporate standards that are squarely within the Court’s
institutional expertise and responsibility.
V. Conclusion
Recusal has come to dominate current conversations about the
Court because it implicates the most foundational features of
Supreme Court jurisprudence—fairness, legitimacy, transparency,
and the proper scope and exercise of governmental power.
Nevertheless, the debate over recusal has so far been framed
almost exclusively as a matter of judicial ethics. This Article is
the second part of an effort to reexamine the recusal issue
through a constitutional lens in order to better illustrate how
structural principles like the separation of powers are necessary
to help us more fully understand the consequences of the Justices’
recusal decisions and the dynamics of tripartite government more
broadly. In an earlier treatment of recusal at the Court, I argued
that statutory recusal standards are inconsistent with the
principle of separation of powers because they unduly infringe on
the Court’s inherent judicial power under Article III of the
Constitution.
The
present
analysis
takes
this
constitutionalization of the recusal debate a step further, asking
how the separation of powers can help us reach a constitutionally
acceptable and effective resolution of the ongoing impasse
between Congress and the Court over recusal.
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The answer can be found at the intersection of Congress’s
status as a constitutional interpreter and all three Branches’
responsibility to promote interbranch coordination and comity in
a tripartite constitutional regime. When the Supreme Court is at
odds with a coequal branch of government, as in the recusal
context, the separation of powers suggests that the Court should
not take it upon itself to resolve the dispute, especially if the
better constitutional argument favors the Justices. It is precisely
in this scenario when Congress must be called on to take up the
interpretive mantle and correct the constitutional impasse in a
way that best promotes effective government. In the context of
recusal, this calls for Congress to cease regulating the Justices’
recusal practices directly, and instead to employ its indirect
constitutional tools such as impeachment, procedural reform,
judicial confirmation, appropriations, and investigation to
influence the Court’s recusal decisions.
Perhaps more importantly, this application of the separation
of powers to the interbranch impasse over recusal offers broader
insights into the best way to think about constitutional conflicts
between the Court and its coordinate Branches going forward. By
considering the role of the Court in its conflict with Congress over
recusal, we are better able to understand which structural
principles can be used to alleviate interbranch tension and diffuse
potential crises of institutional legitimacy. The instant analysis
also highlights a series of critical questions regarding
constitutional structure and dynamics for future research, such
as: Should democratic legitimacy always be the guiding principle
in resolving interbranch disputes? What is each branch’s
institutional responsibility in resolving those disputes? Do those
responsibilities change when a branch is a party to the dispute, or
are they a function of institutional competency and constitutional
authority? Under what circumstances should a coordinate branch
feel comfortable asserting its own interests against another
branch? Does it matter if those interests are legal or political?
What constitutional mechanisms are best suited to provide
resolutions? The constitutional lessons learned from Supreme
Court recusal serve as a template for addressing these bigger
questions about the boundaries of constitutional power and the
role of each of the coordinate Branches in facilitating our
constitutional democracy.

